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I. INTRODUCTION
Yea, all which it inherit, shall dissolve.
-ILLIAM

SHAKESPEARE, THE TEMPEST act 4, sc. 1.

The enactment of the South Carolina Probate Code (SCPC) 1 wrought
the most pervasive single modification of estate and probate law in the
history of the state. Based on the 1983 version of the Uniform Probate Code
(UPC),2 the SCPC retained some aspects of prior South Carolina law, but
reversed a number of entrenched principles and introduced various jurisprudential concepts previously unaddressed by South Carolina law. 3 As with
any omnibus legislation, the SCPC required some time after its effective
date before it could be assimilated into the local practice, which provided
both a prelude to and an integral component of the statute's interpretation. 4

1. Act of June 9, 1986, No. 539, 1986 S.C. Acts 3446 (codified as amended at S.C.
CODE ANN. §§ 62-1-100 to -7-709 (Law. Co-op. 1987 & Supp. 1992)). The SCPC
became effective on July 1, 1987. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-1-100(a) (Law. Co-op. Supp.
1992). For a discussion of the substantive changes that the SCPC had on South Carolina
law, see S. Alan Medlin, Selected Substantive Provisionsof the South CarolinaProbate
Code: A Comparisonwith Previous South CarolinaLaw, 38 S.C. L. REV. 611 (1987).
2. UNIF. PROB. CODE, 8 U.L.A. 1 (1983). The UPC was promulgated in 1969 by
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, id. at 1II, and was
last amended in 1990, id. at III (Supp. 1993).
3. See generally Medlin, supranote I (discussing the effect of the SCPC on previous
South Carolina law).
4. Since the enactment of the SCPC in 1986, the South Carolina General Assembly
has been receptive to concerns about perceived technical and substantive problems with
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss2/3

2

of the South
SOUTH Interpretations
CAROLINA PROBATE
CODE Carolina Probate Cod
1993]Medlin: Result-Oriented

Litigation involving SCPC issues began to reach the appellate level
several years ago, allowing the state appellate courts to participate in the
development of the new law. Because the incorporation of a judicial gloss
is important to the interpretation of any substantial legislation, the South
Carolina appellate courts have had, and will continue to have, unique
opportunities to influence the evolution of estate and probate jurisprudence
under the SCPC. Unfortunately, through either misinterpretation of the
policies underlying various SCPC-related issues or publication of ambiguous
opinions, in a number of recent decisions the South Carolina appellate courts
may have circumvented legislative intent and undermined rights established
under the SCPC. Paradoxically, each of these decisions may have unobjectionably resolved the immediate conflict sub judice while simultaneously
creating ominous precedent for the improper determination of future cases
with similar issues.
This Article examines recent appellate court decisions involving the
elective share, the vesting of substantive rights, and the enforcement of
contracts concerning succession as examples of decisions that potentially
threaten broader legal concepts in apparent attempts to obtain particular
results.
II. THE ELECTIVE SHARE

Virtually every state imposes on a testator limitations designed to ensure
that a surviving spouse may share to some extent in the property titled in the
testator's name.' Most common among these spousal protection laws are

the Act and has amended the SCPC several times. E.g., Act of June 30, 1987, No. 171,
§§ 1-84, 1987 S.C. Acts 2004, 2005-62 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
S.C. CODE ANN. tit. 62 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992)); Act of July 13, 1988, No. 659, §§
1-12, 14-17, 19-21, 1988 S.C. Acts 6111, 6113-31 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of S.C. CODE ANN. tit. 62); Act of June 5, 1990, No. 521, pt. I, 1990 S.C.
Acts 2273, 2274-325 (codified as amended in scattered sections of S.C. CODE ANN. tit.
62); Act of June 12, 1991, No. 143, 1991 S.C. Acts 519 (codified as amended at S.C.
CODE ANN. § 62-3-1001); Act of June 12, 1991, No. 158, 1991 S.C. Acts 553 (codified
as amended at S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-7-302); Act of April 8, 1992, No. 306, §§ 1, 5-6,
1992 S.C. Acts 1881, 1883-900 (codified as amended in scattered sections of S.C. CODE
ANN. tit. 62); Act of June 23, 1992, No. 475, §§ 2-3, 1992 S.C. Acts 2461, 2463-64
(codified as amended at S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 62-1-302(b), 62-7-112). The 1987 and 1990
amendments were extensive. See S. Alan Medlin, Recent Amendments to the South
CarolinaProbate Code, S.C. LAW. Nov.-Dec. 1990, at 37.
5. Methods for ensuring spousal protection include dower, see infra note 7,
homestead exemptions, see, e.g., UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-402, 8 U.L.A. 108 (Supp.
1993), personal property set-asides, see, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-401 (Law. Co-op.
Supp. 1992), family allowances, see, e.g., UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-404, 8 U.L.A. 110
(Supp. 1993), treatment of marital property as community property, see, e.g., id. § 2Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
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those that grant to the surviving spouse an elective or forced share against
the testator's property. 6 Elective share statutes vary in operation, but share
common purposes. They are intended not only to ensure the surviving
spouse some minimum claim in the testator's estate, but also to induce the
testator, aware of the possibility of an elective share claim, to make fair
provision for the spouse in the testamentary plan. The SCPC introduced the
elective share7 into South Carolina law.
A. The Revocable Trust as an Avoidance Technique
Married testators may want to avoid the elective share for a variety of
reasons. For example, a testator who has entered into a subsequent marriage
but has children from a previous marriage may be more concerned with
transferring assets at death to the testator's children rather than to the
surviving spouse. 8 In other cases, the testator may have less appealing
reasons for attempting to circumvent the spousal share, such as a desire to
leave property to a paramour or to disinherit the surviving spouse out of
malice. 9
Regardless of the underlying reason, married testators have employed

102A, 8 U.L.A. 77 (Supp. 1993), and elective or forced share statutes, see, e.g., S.C.
CODE ANN. §§ 62-2-201 to -207 (Law. Co-op, 1987 & Supp. 1992).
6. Every separate-property state except Georgia provides an elective share right to
the surviving spouse. JESSE DUKEMINIER & STANLEY M. JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS,
AND ESTATES 377 & n.2 (4th ed. 1990).

7. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 62-2-201 to -207. The elective share is the most recent form
of spousal protection imposed by South Carolina law. Formerly, a husband was entitled
to the common-law right of curtesy, a life estate in one-third of the wife's real property
if children were born of that marriage. A wife was entitled to the common-law right of
dower, a life estate in one-third of the husband's real property, regardless of whether
they had any children. In 1883, the South Carolina Supreme Court ruled that curtesy had
been impliedly abolished by statute. See Gaffney v. Peeler, 21 S.C. 55, 62 (1883). A
hundred years later, the court ruled dower unconstitutional, Boan v. Watson, 281 S.C.
516, 519, 316 S.E.2d 401, 403 (1984), and the legislature subsequently abolished the
right, Act of May 31, 1985, No. 120, 1985 S.C. Acts 367. From May 22, 1984, the
effective date of the Boan decision, until July 1, 1987, the effective date of the SCPC
with its elective share provisions, South Carolina law provided no significant spousal
protection rights. See Medlin, supra note 1, at 662.
8. For an interesting explanation of the problems inherent in subsequent marriages,
see generally Lawrence W. Waggoner, SpousalRightsin Our Multiple-MarriageSociety:
The Revised Uniform Probate Code, 26 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 683 (1992).
9. Obviously, innumerable other reasons falling between the two extremes may exist.
For instance, the testator may prefer to transfer assets to the testator's needy kin rather
than to an otherwise independently wealthy spouse.
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss2/3
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a variety of devices to avoid the elective share.° Although these elective
share avoidance schemes vary in specific design, they fall into general
patterns. These schemes are typically concocted with a view of the particular
loopholes available under applicable state law. Most state elective share
statutes exclude some type of nonprobate transfer from the reach of the
spousal share."
Testators prefer to retain, if possible, a lifetime right to revoke
nonprobate transfers, thereby allowing them potentially to avoid the elective
share while reserving lifetime control of the transferred property. 2 The
vehicle of choice is the funded revocable inter vivos trust, often designed
with a retained life interest in the testator and a remainder interest in the
intended beneficiary. By retaining the right to revoke, a testator maintains
effective lifetime control over the property. The objective is to avoid the
elective share by rendering the transfer nontestamentary while accomplishing
the testator's ultimate dispositive goals at death.
Testators attempting to skirt the elective share have not always been
successful, even when the applicable state law seems to allow the particular
avoidance device. 3 The South Carolina elective share provisions1 4 appear
to allow avoidance of the elective share through nonprobate transfers,
including revocable trusts. However, in Seifert v. Southern National
Bank, 5 the South Carolina Supreme Court refused to allow a revocable
trust to successfully avoid the reach of the surviving spouse.
In Seifert the decedent attempted to transfer most of his assets into a
revocable inter vivos trust. In addition to the right to revoke, the decedent
retained other "extensive" powers over the trust: the trustee was prohibited
from transferring any of the trust assets without the decedent's permission,
unless the decedent became incompetent or died.' 6 At the time of the decedent's death, the value of the trust was approximately $800,000. The trust
provided that, upon the decedent's death, the trustee was to apportion
$150,000 into a separate trust, known as the Agnes T. Seifert Trust, for the

10. See infra part II.C.4.a.-g.
11. Prior to its amendment in 1990, the UPC did not subject to the elective share
certain types of nonprobate transfers received by the surviving spouse, such as life
insurance. See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-201, 8 U.L.A. 74 (1983); id. § 2-202 & cmt., 8
U.L.A. 74-80. For purposes of this Article, a "nonprobate transfer" is a transfer with
lifetime significance that is not controlled by will or intestacy.
12. Although the nonprobate transfer technically occurs during the testator's lifetime,
the testator avoids relinquishing control until death, practically rendering the nonprobate
transfer as much like a testamentary transfer as possible.
13. See infra part II.C.4.a.-g.
14. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 62-2-201 to -207 (Law. Co-op. 1987 & Supp. 1992).
15. 305 S.C. 353, 409 S.E.2d 337 (1991).
16. Id. at 355, 409 S.E.2d at 338.
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
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decedent's widow. The widow's rights in that trust were limited to income
for life and principal for medical purposes only. 17 Upon the widow's death,
the trustee was to distribute the remainder of the Agnes T. Seifert Trust to
the decedent's two daughters from a previous marriage. 8 In addition, the
decedent's will granted the widow a life interest in the decedent's half of the
marital home and poured over the residue of the decedent's estate into the
daughters' trust.' 9
The widow filed a claim against the decedent's estate, asserting that the
property in the revocable trust should be subject to her elective share.20
The decedent's daughters contended that the assets of the revocable trust
were excluded from the widow's elective share claim. They referred in
particular to an amendment to the SCPC2 1 that changed the property
subject to the elective share from simply the "estate,"' defined broadly by
statute,'m to the "probate estate," 24 apparently defined to exclude nonprobate assets. 5
The Seifert court recognized that the elective share statutes subject only

17. Id. at 354-55, 409 S.E.2d at 338.
18. See id. at 355, 409 S.E.2d at 338. Thus, the daughters were to receive two
distributions under the trust. The first was to occur at the decedent's death and would
consist of those assets not placed in trust for the decedent's widow or otherwise
specifically distributed. The second was to occur at the widow's death and would consist
of the remainder of the $150,000 held in trust for the widow's life. See Record at 16-18.
19. Seifert, 305 S.C. at 355, 409 S.E.2d at 338. Because the decedent had funded the
revocable trust during his lifetime, most of his assets were already in the revocable trust.
Id.
20. Section 62-2-201(a) of the SCPC provides, in relevant part, that "the surviving
spouse has a right of election to take an elective share of one-third of the decedent's
probate estate, as computed under § 62-2-202." S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-201(a) (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1992).
21. Act of June 30, 1987, No. 171, § 5, 1987 S.C. Acts 2004, 2007-08 (codified as
amended at S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-201 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992)). The amendments
to the elective share statute are discussed infra note 58.
22. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-201(a) (Law. Co-op. 1987) (amended 1987).
23. See id. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-202 (Law. Co-op. 1987) ("Estate means the
estate reduced by funeral and administrative expenses and enforceable claims.")
(amended 1987). Section 62-1-201(11) provides the following definition: "'Estate'
includes the property of the decedent, trust, or other person whose affairs are subject to
this Code as originally constituted and as it exists from time to time during administration." Id. § 62-1-201(11).
24. Id. § 62-2-201(a) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992).
25. See id. § 62-2-202 ("For purposes of this Part, probate estate means the
decedent's property passing under the decedent's will plus the decedent's property
passing by intestacy, reduced by funeral and administrative expenses and enforceable
claims.").
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss2/3
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probate assets to the elective share.' However, the court held that the
SCPC does not preclude the assets in a revocable trust declared invalid as
illusory from becoming part of the decedent's probate estate.27 The court
fashioned its conclusion by using bootstrap logic to obtain the apparently
desired result: allowing the widow to claim her elective share against the
assets in the revocable trust. Furthermore, the occasionally ambiguous,
confusing, and contradictory wording of the opinion creates doubt about the
wisdom of the court's reasoning. Perhaps more egregiously, the court
opened a veritable Pandora's box of basic issues, such as the continued
validity of revocable trusts in South Carolina.2"
B. Extensive/SubstantialControl = Illusory = Invalid
The court began its tautologous exercise by determining that the Seifert
trust was "illusory" 29 because-depending on the section of the opinion
referred to-the decedent had either retained "extensive control"3" or
exercised "substantial control" 31 over the trust. The court stated that
"extensive control" was the retention by the settlor of "the same rights"
over the trust assets that he had before creating the trust.32 Furthermore,
in a footnote to the opinion, the court declared: "Substantial control means
that a settlor has retained such extensive powers over the assets of the trust
that he has until death the same rights in the assets after creation of the trust
that he had before its creation. "33 Although the footnote definition speaks

26. Seifert v. Southern Nat'l Bank, 305 S.C. 353, 356, 409 S.E.2d 337, 339 (1991).
27. Id.

28. The revocable trust is a device commonly used by estate planners. See, e.g., 1
3-27 to -28 (2d ed.

ROBERT P. WILKINS, DRAFTING WILLS AND TRUST AGREEMENTS

1991). Doubts about the validity of revocable trusts would create unprecedented concern
in the field of estate planning, in which certainty is a desired commodity because the
client may not be around if a change in the plan becomes necessary. See infra part
H.D. 1. A recent amendment to the SCPC attempted to undo the damage Seifert may have
done to the validity of revocable trusts in South Carolina. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-7112 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992), discussed infra part I.E.
29. Seifert, 305 S.C. at 356, 409 S.E.2d at 338.
30. Id. at 355-56, 409 S.E.2d at 338 (emphasis added).
31. Id. at 357, 409 S.E.2d at 339 (emphasis added).
32. Id. at 355, 409 S.E.2d at 338 (citing Newman v. Dore, 9 N.E.2d 966 (N.Y.
1937); Moore v. Jones, 261 S.E.2d 289 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980)). The Newman court
described extensive control as the retention by the settlor of "substantially the same
rights." Newman, 9 N.E.2d at 968 (emphasis added). In addition, the Moore court
defined extensive power as "in a real sense ... the same rights [existing] after creating
the trust as [existed] before its creation." Moore, 261 S.E.2d at 292. For a criticism of
the Seifert court's reliance on Newman and Moore, see infra part I.C.4.h.
33. Seifert, 305 S.C. at 357 n.2, 409 S.E.2d at 339 n.2 (emphasis added).
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
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only of the "retention" of substantial powers, the text of the opinion refers
to the "exercise" of substantial control.34 Obviously, retention of control
and exercise of control are entirely distinct concepts-a settlor can retain
control without ever exercising it. Yet, the court failed to distinguish
between the two concepts.35
It is unclear whether the court based its determination that the trust was
invalid as illusory on the decedent's mere retention of extensive or
substantial control, or on the decedent's actual exercise of that control. Also
unclear is whether the court determined that the decedent had extensive or
substantial control solely because he retained the right to revoke, or rather
because he retained "additional" extensive powers,3 6including the right to
forbid the trustee from exercising its power of sale.
Nevertheless, the court determined that the trust was illusory and,
therefore, invalid.37 By ruling that the trust was "illusory," the court
invoked a buzzword that has served as a talisman in a number of opinions
from other jurisdictions-albeit with different elective share statutes-that
have invalidated various attempts to avoid the elective share through the use
of revocable trusts.3" Apparently, the Seifert court invalidated the trust to
justify including the trust assets in the "probate estate, " " thereby subject-

34. Id. at 357, 409 S.E.2d at 339 ("[MVe hold that, where a spouse seeks to avoid
payment of the elective share by creating a trust over which he or she exercises
substantial control, the trust may be declared invalid as illusory . . . .") (emphasis
added).
35. Cf. In re Estate of Puetz, 521 N.E.2d 1277, 1281 (IlI. App. Ct. 1988) (stating
that the extent to which retained powers are exercised is a material question of fact).
Nothing in the Seifert opinion, briefs, or record indicates that the decedent ever exercised
his retained control.
36. See supra note 18 and accompanying text; infra notes 76-77 and accompanying
text. The opinion also notes that the original trust agreement and a subsequent
amendment refer to the arrangement as "custodial." Seifert, 305 S.C. at 355,409 S.E.2d
at 338. However, the opinion failed to mention that a second amendment to the trust
deleted any reference to the bank serving in a "custodial capacity" and clarified that the
bank served as trustee. See Record at 31-32.
37. Seifert, 305 S.C. at 356-57, 409 S.E.2d at 338-39. Indeed, the opinion treats the
terms "illusory" and "invalid" as synonymous. See id. at 356, 409 S.E.2d at 339
("[N]othing in the Probate Code prohibits a trust, declared invalid as illusory, from
reverting to the probate estate ....")(emphasis added); id. at 357, 409 S.E.2d at 339
("[T]he trust may be declared invalid as illusory . . . .") (emphasis added); id.
("[NMothing ...prohibits the proceeds of a trust, once declared invalid or illusory[,]
from being included in the probate estate.. . .") (emphasis added).
38. See infra part Il.C.4.a.-g.
39. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-202 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992). The relevant text of this
section is set out supra note 25.
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss2/3
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ing them to the elective share.'
The court analogized Seifert's "illusory" trust to the failure of "an
otherwise valid trust," and observed that "[t]he proceeds of the failed trust
would revert back to the settlor's estate and become part of the residue." 41
This comparison provided the court a reason for including the revocable
trust assets in the decedent's probate estate.42 Thus, the trust property
became "part of the estate for elective share purposes.""
The court further supported its decision by referring to the SCPC
statute that allows a waiver of the elective share.' The court attempted to
construct another tautology by reasoning that, because the statute permits a
waiver, the elective share right must be substantial, and that because the
elective share right is substantial, it cannot be circumvented as urged by the
respondents.45 The opinion concluded: "[W]here a spouse seeks to avoid
payment of the elective share by creating a trust over which he or she
exercises substantial control, the trust may be declared invalid as illusory,
and the trust assets will be included in the decedent's estate for calculation
of the elective share."46 Accordingly, the court remanded the case for
determination of the wife's elective share.47

40. See Seifert, 305 S.C. at 357, 409 S.E.2d at 339.
41. Id. at 356, 409 S.E.2d at 339 ("We see very little difference between this
situation and one in which an otherwise valid trust fails.").
42. Whether the failure of the trust is total or only for elective share purposes is
problematic. See infra part lI.C.3.a.
43. Seifert, 305 S.C. at 356, 409 S.E.2d at 339 (emphasis added). The court's use of
the term "estate" instead of "probate estate" to refer to the collection of assets against
which the elective share could be charged is perhaps a Freudian slip. The court creatively
devised a method by which the trust assets could be included in the "probate estate"-by
express statutory definition the only assets of a decedent chargeable with the elective
share; yet, the opinion described the assets subject to spousal election as simply the
"estate," a much broader and more ambiguous term.
Concern that the original version of the elective share statutes, which calculated the
elective share from the decedent's "estate," would be misinterpreted to subject nonprobate assets to election prompted the amendment to the SCPC that clarified the intent
to subject only probate assets to the elective share. See infra note 58 and accompanying
text. By using the term "estate," however, the Seifert court not only exposed its
disregard of legislative intent, but also foreshadowed the likely progeny of its decision.
See infra part lI.C.3-3.a.; part T.D.3.
44. Seifert, 305 S.C. at 357, 409 S.E.2d at 339. The elective share waiver statute
provides: "The right of election of a surviving spouse ...

may be waived

. . .

by a

written contract, agreement, or waiver signed by the party waiving after fair disclosure."
S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-204 (Law. Co-op. 1987).
45. Seifert, 305 S.C. at 357, 409 S.E.2d at 339.
46. Id. (footnote omitted).
47. Id.
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
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C. A Critique of Seifert
Perhaps the most difficult aspect of criticizing the Seifert opinion is
deciding where to begin. The questionable reasoning used by the court in its
apparent obsession to obtain a result4" left in its wake the potential for
enervation of clear legislative intent49 and the portent of a possible farreaching disruption of time-honored concepts of trust law.5" The problems
with the opinion, both in concept and presentation, are numerous.
1. History of the Elective Share in South Carolina
As discussed previously, no elective share right existed in South
Carolina before the general assembly enacted the SCPC.5' One preliminary
version of the SCPC bill contained an elective share provision, similar to the
UPC version, 2 that allowed a surviving spouse to claim the elective share
against the "augmented estate," which included nonprobate assets such as
revocable inter vivos trusts.5 3 The general assembly rejected the "augmented estate" concept as too complex and instead adopted a "simpler"
version of the elective share calculated against the "estate" of the decedent.54 As the Seifert court admitted, the legislature's intent in rejecting the
"augmented estate" was to avoid the "elaborate system of incorporating
various non-probate assets into the estate."'
However, the term "estate," defined in SCPC section 62-1-201(11),
"includes the property of the decedent, trust, or other person whose affairs
are subject to this Code as originally constituted and as it exists from time
to time during administration."56 Because the definition of "estate"

48. Why the court might have felt compelled to obtain a result in favor of the widow

is another question. Equitable considerations were not necessarily in her favor. She had
income benefits from the most recent of her four previous marriages. Record at 115,

118-19. In addition, she knew about the trust several months before the decedent began
funding it. Id. at 120-22, 132. Finally, she received the income from the $150,000 trust
for life, id. at 16-17, and some property interests under the will, id. at 35-36. For

examples of how the elective share can render unfair results, see Waggoner, supranote
8, at 715-48.
49. See infra part ll.C.4.h.
50. See infra part II.D.2.

51. See supra note 7.
52. See UNIF. PROB. CODE §§ 2-201 to -202, 8 U.L.A. 74-77 (1983).
53. See infra note 58.

54. See Setfert, 305 S.C. at 356-57, 409 S.E.2d at 339 (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 622-202 cmt. (Law. Co-op. 1987) (amended 1987)).

55. Id. at 356, 409 S.E.2d at 339.
56. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-1-201(11) (Law. Co-op. 1987).
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss2/3
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arguably might have subjected nonprobate assets to the elective share, the
general assembly amended sections 62-2-201 and 62-2-202 to provide that
the elective share may be enforced against only probate assets,57 which the
SCPC defines as the property passing under a decedent's will or by
intestacy. 8
Consequently, nonprobate or nontestamentary assets, 59 by definition,
should not be subject to the elective share. A transfer is nontestamentary if
the transferor affords lifetime significance to the transfer by presently
transferring some interest to the transferee.' Although courts and com-

57. Act of June 30, 1987, No. 171, §§ 5-6, 1987 S.C. Acts 2004, 2007-08 (codified
as amended at S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 62-2-201 to -202 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992)).
58. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 62-2-201 to -202. At the request of the South Carolina
Senate Judiciary Committee, the author served as chair of a committee convened to
suggest technical corrections to the original version of the SCPC. The committee met
during November and December of 1986 and formulated a number of technical corrections, which the author presented in bill form to the Senate Judiciary Committee in
January 1987. The bill included the language amending SCPC §§ 62-2-201 and 62-2-202,
which was enacted verbatim by the general assembly. The report accompanying the draft
bill explained that the purpose of these proposed amendments was to clarify the elective
share provisions, thereby making them conform to the general assembly's original intent

to limit the elective share to probate assets. The general assembly enacted the bill to be
effective July 1, 1987, the same effective date as the original version of the SCPC. Act
of June 30, 1987, § 91, 1987 S.C. Acts at 2070.

In 1989 both Judiciary Committees of the general assembly retained the author to
form a committee to study and propose technical and substantive changes to the SCPC.
As a result, the Joint Study Committee for the SCPC was formed. Its members included
several estate planning and probate practitioners, two probate judges, one state senator,
and one state representative. After soliciting proposals for amendments to the SCPC from
interested persons and studying the various suggestions, the Committee presented two
proposed bills and an accompanying report to the Judiciary Committees. The general
assembly enacted the first proposed bill, which contained numerous amendments. Act of
June 5, 1990, No. 521, 1990 S.C. Acts 2273 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of S.C. CODE ANN. tit. 62 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992)). The second bill proposed an
amendment to the elective share which would have provided that the elective share be
charged against an augmented estate containing nonprobate assets, such as revocable inter
vivos trusts. H.R. 4956, 108th Leg., 2d Sess. (1990). The general assembly failed to
enact this elective share amendment.
59. For purposes of this Article, the terms "nonprobate" and "nontestamentary" are
synonymous.
60. See Medlin, supranote 1, at 664 n.244; cf Randler v. Ogburn (In re Estate of
Ogburn), 406 P.2d 655, 660 (Wyo. 1965) (discussing the distinction between gross estate
and probate estate). See generally Carolyn B. Featheringill, Estate Tax Apportionment
and NonprobateAssets: Pickingthe Right Pocket, 21 CUMB. L. REv. 1, 2-5 (1990-1991)
(explaining the difference between probate and nonprobate assets).

For example, if A retains a life estate in Greenacre, but transfers the remainder
interest to B, B has immediately received an interest in property. B can sell, mortgage,
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

11

South
Carolina
Law Review,
Vol. 44, Iss. 2 [2020],
3
SOUTH
CAROLINA
LAW REVIEW
[Vol.Art.
44:287

mentators may have some difficulty describing the interest immediately
transferred to a beneficiary upon the creation of a revocable inter vivos
trust,6" it is well established that a settlor's retention of the power to
revoke does not render a trust testamentary.6 2
2. The Revocable Trust in South Carolina
The common law of South Carolina has long regarded a revocable trust
as a valid method of nontestamentary transfer.63 Furthermore, South
Carolina has several statutes recognizing the validity of revocable trusts as
nontestamentary. Section 62-6-201(a) of the SCPC acknowledges that a
transfer "otherwise effective as a. . . trust" is nontestamentary. 61 Because
a revocable trust is "otherwise valid" under South Carolina common law,
section 62-6-201(a) implicitly validates this nontestamentary device. In
addition, section 62-7-603(A)(3) confirms the validity of a trust in which the
same person holds both legal and equitable title unless the sole fiduciary is
also the sole beneficiary, even if the trust is revocable.65 Thus, a revocable

assign, or gift the remainder interest and can enjoin A from committing waste to the
property. B obtains these immediate rights even though B's possession or enjoyment is
delayed until the future-at A's death. Thus, B has a future interest, as compared to a
present interest for which the right to possess or enjoy is immediate. The transmission
of these immediate rights to B constitutes a nontestamentary transfer. See S.C. CODE
ANN. § 62-6-201(a) (Law. Co-op. 1987). Therefore, the remainder interest in Greenacre
does not pass by will or intestacy atA's death becauseA has already given it away during
A's lifetime.
61. See, e.g., Farkas v. Williams, 125 N.E.2d 600 (Ill. 1955).
62. E.g., IA AUSTIN W. SCOTT & WILLIAM F. FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS §
57.1, at 125 (4th ed. 1987).
63. See, e.g., Chiles v. Chiles, 270 S.C. 379, 242 S.E.2d 426 (1978) (recognizing
the ability of a settlor to create a revocable trust by retaining a right to revoke). See
generally Steven E. Williford, Survey, ProbateLaw-Seifert v. Southern National Bank,
44 S.C. L. REv. 137, 141 & n.31 (1992).
64. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-6-201(a) (Law. Co-op. 1987).
65. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-7-603(A)(3) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992). The history
of this section helps to support the validity of revocable trusts. In 1988, the general
assembly enacted § 62-7-603 in its original version to accomplish two purposes: (1) to
confirm that no merger of legal and equitable title occurs unless the same person alone
holds both legal and equitable title; and (2) to confirm the common-law rule that a cotrustee cannot participate in a decision that would benefit the co-trustee as beneficiary of
the trust because of the inherent conflict of interest. See Act of June 1, 1988, No. 596,
§ 1, 1988 S.C. Acts 5006, 5007-08. Subsection (B) of the original version of the statute
applied an exception to both purposes: "Subsection (A) of this section does not apply to
revocable trusts in which the fiduciary of the trust is also the creator of the trust and is
living." Id. § 2, 1988 S.C. Acts at 5009.
Estate planners believed that the application of the exception to both purposes of
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss2/3
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trust may be valid in South Carolina even if the settlor both serves as trustee
and is the life beneficiary.' Finally, SCPC section 62-2-510, South
Carolina's version of the Uniform Testamentary Additions to Trusts Act, 67
recognizes the validity of a testamentary pour-over into a revocable trust,
similar to the plan intended by the decedent in Seifert. Section 62-2-510
provides, in part: "A devise or bequest... may be made by a will to the
trustee of a trust. . . . The devise is not invalid because the trust is
amendable or revocable . . 68
3. Invalidation of the Revocable Trust
To subject the assets of the trust to the elective share, the Seifert court
had to create a stratagem to make the trust property part of the probate
estate, despite the historical treatment of revocable trusts as nonprobate
assets. The court adopted the conceit of having the trust fail completely as
illusory. 69 Although it is difficult to tell from the opinion, the court
apparently considered the trust to be illusory because the decedent retained
the right to revoke in combination with other "extensive powers."7' The
court observed that "[tihe role of the trustee was described in the trust
agreement and in a subsequent amendment as 'custodial.'"7 In referring
to the subsequent amendment to the trust, the court was either careless in its
research or careful in its language to obfuscate the facts: the subsequent
amendment expressly deleted the language that described the trustee's role
as custodial. 72

the statute was unintended, and that the exception was supposed to apply only to the
conflict of interest purpose. Consequently, in 1990 the general assembly amended § 62-7-

603(B), which currently provides: "Items (1)and (2) of subsection (A)of this section do
not apply to revocable trusts in which the fiduciary of the trust is also the creator of the

trust and is living." Act of June 5, 1990, No. 521, § 94, 1990 S.C. Acts 2273, 2319-20
(codified as amended at S.C.

CODE ANN.

§ 62-7-603(B) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992)).

Because the no-merger purpose of the statute is found in subsection (A)(3), the
amendment operates to confirm the no-merger rule even if the trust is revocable. Thus,
the legislature implicitly recognized the validity of revocable trusts.
66. In Seifert the settlor did not serve as trustee. See Seifert v. Southern Nat'l Bank,
305 S.C. 353, 355, 409 S.E.2d 337, 338 (1991).
67. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-511, 8 U.L.A. 122 (Supp. 1993).
68. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-510(a) (Law. Co-op. 1987).

69. See supra part ll.B.
70. See supra notes 29-36 and accompanying text.
71. Seifert, 305 S.C. at 355, 409 S.E.2d at 338.
72. See Record at 31. The first amehdment to the trust agreement expressly omitted
the clause in the original trust agreement that referred to the trustee's role as "custodial":
Article II is amended by striking out the clause reading "the Trustee shall
serve essentially in a custodial capacity and its fees and commissions shall be
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
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The only other "extensive retained power" mentioned in the opinion
was the decedent's lifetime right to veto the sale, investment, or reinvestment of any trust asset by the trustee.73 The court failed to mention,
however, that the trust specifically provided an additional fee to the trustee
if the decedent withdrew any principal.74 Obviously, the provision of such
a fee to a trustee indicates that the decedent did not retain the "same rights"
he had before creating the trust.75
However, any discussion by the court about retained rights other than
the power to revoke is superfluous. The right to revoke is the ultimate right
that a settlor can retain; all other rights are incidental. 76 A settlor retaining
the right to revoke can effectively control the trustee in every aspect of the
trust administration: if the trustee fails to obey the directions of the settlor,
the settlor can simply revoke the trust. Moreover, the settlor of a revocable
trust does not retain the same rights after creation of the trust as before
creation because the settlor must at least exercise the right of revocation
before reasserting absolute ownership of the trust property. 77 Thus, if a
trust is valid despite the retained right to revoke, it should be valid despite
the retention of any additional incidental rights. In fact, virtually every court
has recognized revocable trusts as valid nontestamentary transfers.7 8
limited to the commissions for custodial services stipulated in its regularly
published Schedule of Compensation in effect at the time such compensation
may become payable and at the time said services are rendered" ....
Id. The decedent executed the original trust on August 5, 1987, id. at 13, and the first
amendment to the trust on July 7, 1988, id. at 33.
73. See Seifert, 305 S.C. at 355, 409 S.E.2d at 338.
74. See Record at 134.
75. See supra notes 29-36 and accompanying text.
76. See WILLIAM D. MACDONALD, FRAUD ON THE VIDOW'S SHARE 90 (1960) ("[I]t
is the power to revoke that gives the settlor the greatest substantial control."); Van F.
McClellan, Note, Inter Vivos Transfers: Will They Stand up Against the Surviving
Spouse's Elective Share?, 14 OKLA. CITY U. L. REv. 605, 623 (1989). Actually, the

retained right to amend is commensurate with the retained right to revoke. A settlor who
retains only a right to revoke can nevertheless effectively amend the trust by revoking
the original and creating a new trust with the desired terms. Similarly, a settlor who
retains only a right to amend can nevertheless effectively revoke the trust by amending
the original to include a right to revoke and then exercising the right to revoke. Under
South Carolina law, the general rule is that a settlor retains neither the right to revoke
nor the right to amend unless specifically provided in the trust. See Chiles v. Chiles, 270
S.C. 379, 384, 242 S.E.2d 426, 429 (1978).
77. For example, an absolute owner may sell Blackacre without further action. If,
however, the owner had previously transferred Blackacre into a revocable trust, the
owner must first revoke the trust, by whatever method is required, before selling
Blackacre. To sell Blackacre, the settlor of the revocable trust must take at least one
more step than the absolute owner.
78. See infra note 210 and accompanying text. Statutes have also recognized the
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss2/3

14

Interpretations
of theCODE
South Carolina Probate Cod
PROBATE
SOUTH CAROLINA
1993] Medlin: Result-Oriented

Some courts in other jurisdictions have weighed equitable factors to
invalidate trusts not completely, but rather for elective share purposes only,
when the decedent retained excessive control over the trust. 79 However, the
Seifert court had to invalidate the trust completely to create a resulting trust
so that the trust assets would be included in the decedent's probate estate."'
In so doing, the court not only ignored pertinent South Carolina statutes and
common law, but also misread or misapplied the cited case law from other
jurisdictions."1
a. The Resulting Trust Theory
Because the SCPC subjects only probate assets to the elective share,'
the Seifert court had to invalidate the revocable inter vivos trust, thereby
causing the assets 3 of the failed trust to "revert back to the settlor's
estate."84 The court equated the invalidation of the illusory trust with the
failure of a trust: "We see very little difference between this situation and
one in which an otherwise valid trust fails. " ' Without citing authority, the
court cursorily stated that the assets of a failed trust "revert" to the settlor's
estate,8 6 so that absolute ownership of the assets is maintained by the
person who attempted to create the failed trust and intended the assets to be
subject to the trust.
The court's discussion of the trust's failure was superficial because the

validity of a trust in which the settlor retains the right to revoke. See supra notes 64-68
and accompanying text.
79. See, e.g., Newmanv. Dore, 9 N.E.2d 966,969 (N.Y. 1937); Johnsonv. Farmers
& Merchants Bank, 379 S.E.2d 752, 757 (%V.Va. 1989); see also Taliaferro v. Taliaferro, 843 P.2d 240 (Kan. 1992) (discussing the difference between total invalidation and

partial contribution from a revocable inter vivos trust for spousal share purposes only).
80. See infra part II.C.3.a.
81. See infra part II.C.4.h.
82. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-201(a) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992); see also supra
note 58 (discussing the history of South Carolina's elective share statutes and the probate

estate).
83. The court actually used the term "proceeds," Seifert v. Southern Nat'l Bank, 305
S.C. 353, 356, 409 S.E.2d 337, 339 (1991), which is usually intended to define earnings

and income from trust assets. Apparently, the court meant to use the term "assets." If
the court meant to use "proceeds" in its usual sense, then only the earnings from the
failed trust, rather than the entire trust property, would revert to the settlor's estate and
thus be subject to the elective share.
84. Id. (emphasis added). Again, despite the casual use of the term "estate," the court

must have intended to use the term "probate estate," which by statutory directive is the
only part of the decedent's property subject to the elective share. See supra note 43.
85. Seifert, 305 S.C. at 356, 409 S.E.2d at 339.

86. Id.
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court failed to distinguish the two times at which a trust can fail: (1) upon
the attempt to create the trust;87 or (2) at some time after the trust has
obtained validity.88 In the former situation, the trust fails because it was
never created. In the latter, the trust is created, but subsequently fails. Upon
a trust's failure, the trustee 9 must return the property to the settlor, unless
the settlor has evidenced a contrary intent.' ° To allow the trustee to retain
title to the property would result in a windfall to the trustee. The so-called
"resulting trust" is the equitable remedy that arises automatically by
operation of law and, absent the settlor's contrary intent, requires the return
of the property to the settlor.9'
The Seifert court did not even mention the term "resulting trust," let
alone that the resulting trust theory does not require a return of the property
to the settlor if the settlor indicated a contrary intent. However, the court
implicitly relied on a resulting trust theory in effect to return the trust assets
to the decedent to become part of his probate estate. Although the court did
not specify when the trust failed, the trust had to fail either upon the
decedent's attempt to create it or at some time after it became valid.' In
either situation, under the applicable law, a resulting trust would not
necessarily ensue from the failure of the trust if the decedent evidenced a
87. A trust's failure upon its attempted creation typically occurs when there is no trust
beneficiary, thus preventing the division of legal and equitable title essential to the
creation of a trust. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 411 cmt. g (1957);
GEORGE T. BOGERT, TRUSTS § 75 (6th ed. 1987); AUSTIN W. SCOTT, ABRIDGMENT OF
THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 411.1 (1960).
88. The subsequent failure of an initially valid trust usually occurs when the purpose
of the trust becomes illegal or impossible to accomplish, or when the purpose is
completed without exhausting all of the trust property. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TRUSTS § 411; BOGERT, supra note 87, §§ 75, 150; SCOTT, supra note 87, §§ 335,

404.1.
89. The use of the term "trustee" may be technically imprecise in the first situation

because, if a trust was never created, then there is no trustee.
90. See Pate v. Ford, 293 S.C. 268, 280-81, 360 S.E.2d 145, 152-53 (Ct. App.
1987), rev'd on other grounds, 297 S.C. 294, 376 S.E.2d 775 (1989); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 411-12; BOGERT, supra note 87, §§ 75, 150; ScOTT, supra note
87, §§ 345.3, 411-411.1.
91. See authorities cited supra note 90.

92. See supra notes 87-88. The spouse's elective share right did not arise until the
decedent died. Presumably, if the trust failed after it became valid, the failure occurred
at or after the decedent's death because only then did the trust interfere with the spouse's
elective share right. In that event, three likely possibilities exist concerning when the
trust failed: (1) at the moment of the decedent's death; (2) when the spouse presented her
elective share claim; or (3) at the time of the court's ruling. By relying on any of these
three theories, the court would essentially be ruling that the trust was valid during the
decedent's lifetime, but failed at the specified time because the trust interfered with the
surviving spouse's elective share right.
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss2/3
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contrary intent. 3 The court's reasoning is faulty regardless of when the
trust failed.
If the trust failed at the time of its attempted creation, then a resulting
trust arose and the putative trustee should have returned to the settlor the
assets intended for the trust.' Because the assets did not belong to the
failed trust, but rather to the settlor, they were by definition included in his
probate estate and subject to the elective share. By finding that the revocable
trust was entirely invalid because the settlor retained or exercised too much
control, the court either ignored or intended to change dramatically basic
South Carolina trust law, which had recognized the validity of a revocable
inter vivos trust despite the settlor's retention of ultimate control-the right
to revoke. 95
One could argue that the court did not intend to invalidate the trust
entirely, particularly because the Seifert opinion repeatedly describes the
failure of the trust with qualifying language. 96 However, this argument is

93. Arguably, the decedent in Seifert evidenced an intent that the trust assets not
return to him if the trust failed both by providing for distribution of the trust assets to his
daughters at the anticipated termination of the trust and by his general dispositive plan,
which indicated his desire to avoid subjecting the trust assets to the elective share. See
supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
94. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
95. See supra part JI.C.2.
96. See Seifert, 305 S.C. at 355-56, 409 S.E.2d at 338-39. At several places in the
opinion, the court seemed to limit its holding to an invalidation of the trust for elective
share purposes only. See, e.g., id. at 355, 409 S.E.2d at 338 ("Widow contends ... that
the trust assets should be included in Husband's estate for purposes of valuing her
elective share."); id. at 356, 409 S.E.2d at 339 ("The trust property would then be part
of the estate for elective share purposes."); id. ("Similarly, nothing in the Probate Code
prohibits a trust, declared invalid as illusory, from reverting to the probate estate and
being included in it for elective share purposes."); id. ("[W]e hold that the proceeds of
the trust should be included in Husband's estate for the purpose of calculating Widow's
elective share.").
Elsewhere, however, the court's language indicates that the invalidation of the trust
was absolute. See, e.g., id. at 355-56, 409 S.E.2d at 338 ("In light of the evidence...
we find that the trust is illusory and, thus, invalid."). The court used perhaps its most
inconsistent language in the sentence that purports to announce its holding:
"[VMe hold that, where a spouse seeks to avoid payment of the elective share
by creating a trust over which he or she exercises substantial control, the trust
may be declaredinvalidas illusory, and the trust assetswill be included in the
decedent's estate for calculation of the elective share."
Id. at 357, 409 S.E.2d at 339 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). This sentence could
support an argument that the court invalidated the trust either absolutely or for elective
share purposes only.
However, the court's inconsistent use of language does not affect whether the court
intended to invalidate the trust entirely. Even if the court meant to state consistently that
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
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without merit. The trust assets could be included in the decedent's probate
estate under the resulting trust theory only if the trust failed completely. If
the trust did not fail completely, then there could be no resulting trust.'
In that event, the assets would not revert to the settlor, would not be
included in his probate assets, and, by definition, would not be subject to
the elective share.9" Because the court implicitly relied on the resulting
trust theory to include the assets in the decedent's probate estate, the trust
must fail completely.'
Cases from other jurisdictions that subject the assets of revocable trusts
to the elective share do not totally invalidate these trusts. Rather, the trusts
are considered generally valid and are invalidated only for the purpose of
subjecting the assets to the elective share."0 The difference between using
a resulting trust and invalidating an illusory trust only for elective share
purposes is considerable: a resulting trust generally occurs when a trust fails
ever to obtain validity or, after obtaining validity, fails entirely; however,
a trust considered "illusory" for elective share purposes only is considered
valid for all other purposes."'
Unlike other jurisdictions that limit the invalidation of a revocable trust
only for the purpose of calculating the elective share, the Seifert court
invalidated the trust entirely. Anything short of an absolute and complete
invalidation would fail to obtain the court's desired result: including in the

the trust was invalid for elective share purposes only, that result is untenable. Because
the court used the resulting trust theory to invalidate the trust, it necessarily invalidated
the trust in its entirety; otherwise, the resulting trust theory would be inapplicable. The
resulting trust theory would not operate to invalidate the trust for elective share purposes
only. See supra notes 87-91 and accompanying text.
97. See supranotes 90-91 and accompanying text.
98. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 62-2-201 to -202 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992).

99. Whether the court could have chosen another theory to subject the trust assets to
the elective share is problematic. Other jurisdictions have used various theories to
invalidate revocable trusts for elective share purposes only. See infra part lI.C.4.a.-g.
The basic premise of such decisions is that, even though the applicable statutes appeared

to allow avoidance of the elective share through the use of a revocable trust, the court
can use its equitable powers to disallow an attempted avoidance in certain situations. See
infra part il.C.4.a.-g. Presumably, the Seifert court was reluctant to choose such a path

because of the clear and narrow language of the South Carolina elective share statutes.
See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 62-2-201 to -202; supra note 58. Admitting to an equitable
nullification of the revocable trust avoidance technique would indicate a deliberate disregard for the express intent of the general assembly, whereas using the resulting trust

theory to include the trust assets in the decedent's probate estate obscured the court's
end-run around the statute.
100. See infra part ll.C.4.a.-g.
101. E.g., Newman v. Dore, 9 N.E.2d 966, 969 (N.Y. 1937) ("We assume ... that
except for the [elective share provision] the trust would be valid.").
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decedent's probate estate the assets slated for the trust."' 2 If the invalidation of the trust were limited so that the trust assets did not "revert" to the
decedent, then the assets would not be included in his probate estate and,
thus, would not be subject to the elective share.
Moreover, the Seifert court could not have used some theory other than
the resulting trust theory to partially invalidate the trust for elective share
purposes only. The court expressly claimed that it was not violating the
general assembly's express intent to limit the elective share to probate
assets: 3 "[N]othing in the Probate Code prohibits a trust, declared invalid
as illusory, from reverting to the probate estate and being included in it for
elective share purposes.""n If the general assembly meant what it said in
amending the SCPC to limit the elective share to the probate estate, 5
then the trust assets in Seifert could have been subject to the elective share
under only two possibilities: (1) the trust assets were part of the probate
estate under the resulting trust theory because the trust failed entirely; or (2)
the trust assets became part of the probate estate for some equitable
reason. 106
If the court used the resulting trust theory to invalidate the trust
entirely, it at least had some legal precedent to argue that the intended trust
assets became probate assets." 7 If the court silently relied on some other
theory, however, it acted as a super-legislature, merely paying lip service
to the legislative intent to limit the elective share to probate assets. Allowing
the court to decide what constitutes the probate estate for elective share
purposes-despite the court's recognition that the legislature intended to
limit the elective share to only the probate estate-would render meaningless
the express language of the statute.
If the court meant instead that the trust failed at or after the decedent's
death, then the court apparently acted even more like a super-legislature,
disregarding the clear language of the elective share statutes while professing
to observe the legislature's intent. If the trust failed at or after the decedent's
death, then the trust was valid from the time of its execution until the time
of its failure. Thus, the assets were subject to the trust during the decedent's
lifetime and could not be considered part of his probate estate simply
because he owned them at his death. Rather, the nonprobate trust assets

102. See supra text accompanying note 97.
103. See supra note 58.
104. Seifert v. Southern Nat'l Bank, 305 S.C. 353, 357, 409 S.E.2d 337, 339 (1991).
105. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 62-2-201 to -202 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992).
106. See infra part II.C.4.a.-g.
107. See supranotes 90-93 and accompanying text. The court nevertheless disregarded
any evidence that the decedent may have intended to avoid the usual outcome of the
resulting trust-reversion to the decedent. See supra note 93.
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became probate assets only after the court declared the trust invalid as
illusory because the court decided that the assets should be subject to the
elective share. If the court can make any asset a nonprobate asset merely
because it wants to, then it has eviscerated both the language of the elective
share statutes and the express purpose of the general assembly.
Thus, the court either used the right theory (complete invalidation/resulting trust) for the wrong reason (retention or exercise of substantial
or extensive control), or it used the wrong theory (partial invalidation) for
perhaps the right reason (equitable factors). Either way, the ratio decidendi
of the Seifert opinion is flawed.
b. Waiver = SubstantialRight = Unavoidable
The Seifert court buttressed its finding that the trust was subject to the
elective share by observing that SCPC section 62-2-204, which requires a
waiver of the elective share to be in writing, 08 indicates that the legislature intended the right to receive the elective share to be "substantial.' 0 9
From this assumption the court simply presumed that the legislature did not
"inten[d] to allow this substantial right to be circumvented as respondents
urge.""' Although the court recognized that the elective share statute
clearly limits the elective share to probate assets, it determined in effect
that, because the elective share right is substantial, the general assembly did
not really intend to limit the elective share only to probate assets.
The requirement in section 62-2-204 that an effective waiver of the
elective share be in writing does not itself render the right "substantial."
Rather, the requirement was intended merely to simplify problems of proof,
much in the spirit of other SCPC provisions that attempt to avoid oral
claims, which are more difficult to prove or disprove.'

108. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-204 (Law. Co-op. 1987).
109. Se fert, 305 S.C. at 357, 409 S.E.2d at 339.
110. Id.
111. E.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-110 (Law. Co-op. 1987) (requiring a writing to
treat property given during lifetime as an advancement); id. § 62-2-701 (Law. Co-op.
Supp. 1992) (requiring that contracts concerning wills be in writing). Whether a spouse
has waived the elective share can be a hotly disputed issue. For example, a husband and

wife may enter into a prenuptial agreement, with each generally waiving any interest in
the other's estate. The usual catalyst for the prenuptial agreement is the fear of divorce,
yet the agreement is typically broad enough to include rights in the deceased spouse's
estate. If the marriage ends because of a spouse's death rather than by divorce, the

surviving spouse may claim an elective share in the estate. The estate of the deceased
spouse will raise the prenuptial waiver as a defense to the surviving spouse's elective

share claim. The surviving spouse will contend that the prenuptial agreement was not
intended to waive elective share rights, especially if the prenuptial agreement does not
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss2/3
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Few would disagree that the elective share right is substantial, but
whether the elective share right is substantial has no rational connection to
the question of what property may be subject to the elective share." 2 To
extend the Seifert court's logic, if the assets of a revocable trust are subject
to the elective share merely because the elective share right is substantial,
then arguably all other nonprobate assets must similarly be subject to the
elective share." 3 Certainly, nonprobate assets including revocable trusts
could be outside the reach of the elective share without rendering the right
insubstantial. Therefore, the court's supporting thesis is a non sequitur.
c. Freedom of Testation
By invalidating the revocable trust, the Seifert court failed to consider
the significant body of law that supports the freedom of a testator to alienate
property during the testator's lifetime." 4 The court in Newman v.
Dore"5 admitted that the surviving spouse's interest in the elective share
is only an expectant interest dependent upon the contingency that the
property to which the interest attaches becomes part of a decedent's
estate. The contingency does not occur, and the expectant property right
does not ripen into a property right in possession, if the owner sells or
gives away the property. 116
In addition, the court in Moore v. Jones. 7 observed that "'[i]n a broad
sense, the problem presents a conflict between the public policy considerations favoring protection of a surviving spouse against disinheritance, and
those policy considerations favoring the free alienability of property inter vivos. '2118 Although the Seifert opinion cited both Newman and Moore, the

specifically refer to the elective share. In such cases, the court often makes its decision
after considering equitable factors. See generally S. Alan Medlin, Waiving the Elective
Share, PROB. PRAC. REP., Apr. 1989, at 1 (discussing factors courts use to determine
whether elective share waiver is valid).

112. This is especially true in view of the legislature's special attention to the
definition of what assets are subject to the elective share. See supra note 58.
113. See infra part II.D.3.
114. See, e.g., Payne v. River Forest State Bank & Trust Co., 401 N.E.2d 1229, 1231
OF TRUSTS § 57 cmt. c (1957); SCOTr &

(Ill. App. Ct. 1980); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
FRATCHER, supra note 62, § 57.2, at 140.
115. 9 N.E.2d 966 (N.Y. 1937).

116. Id. at 967.
117. 261 S.E.2d 289 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980).
118. Id. at 292 (quoting J.R. Kemper, Annotation, Validity of Inter Vivos Trust

Establishedby One Spouse Which Impairsthe OtherSpouse's DistributiveShare or Other
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Seifert court did not even discuss the conflicting right of the decedent to
freely alienate property inter vivos.
4. Alternative Theories
Other jurisdictions have addressed the issue of whether testators may
circumvent the spousal elective share by employing various avoidance
techniques. A review of other jurisdictions' treatment of revocable trusts as
avoidance techniques is instructive for two reasons: First, it highlights the
Seifert court's misapprehension of and misreliance on the resulting trust
theory; second, it provides sound alternative theories for the Seifert court's
result.119
Because most forced share statutes calculate the survivor's claim based
on the size of the decedent's probate estate, 120 augmented in a number of
states by certain nonprobate assets,' most avoidance devices involve
reducing the probate estate through inter vivos transfers that allow the
testator to retain some benefits of ownership. Like Seifert, a number of
cases have involved attempts by the surviving spouse to invalidate these
inter vivos avoidance devices, thereby increasing the size of the probate
estate and, consequently, the elective share entitlement. In deciding whether
to invalidate these transfers, the courts have invoked a number of theories
and tests, some distinct and some overlapping.
a. General Theories of Invalidation
In Johnson v. Farmers & Merchants Bank'2 the West Virginia
Supreme Court provided a concise summary of the various theories courts
have used in considering the efficacy of these ploys for avoiding the elective
share. In Johnson the testator and his wife were married in 1963, and each
had children from a previous marriage. The testator's net worth at the time
of his death exceeded $1 million, including real estate, cash, and substantial
ownership of three closely-held corporations. Despite his wealth, the testator
was parsimonious about giving his wife money for her personal use. During
his lifetime he maintained title to the vast majority of his assets, giving his

Statutory Rights in Property, 39 A.L.R.3D 14, 18 (1971)).
119. Because of the specificity of the South Carolina elective share statutes, however,
even these other theories may be inappropriate to a case considering the South Carolina

elective share.
120. See, e.g., N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 560:10 (1974); S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-201
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992).
121. E.g., N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-1.1 (McKinney 1981).
122. 379 S.E.2d 752 (W. Va. 1989).
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss2/3
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wife only a one-half interest in their home, a car, and a checking account
for household expenses."iu
The testator in Johnson created and funded a revocable inter vivos trust
with retained lifetime benefits and powers similar to the trust in Seifert. By
the terms of the trust and by an accompanying letter, the testator retained
the exclusive right to sell his stock in the closely-held companies without the
usual trustee's commission. After the testator's death, his widow was to
receive the income from a portion of the trust assets, and his children were
to take the remaining income. After the widow died and the children
attained a certain age, the children were to receive all of the principal. 4
The Johnson court aligned itself with other courts by recognizing that
a testator may permissibly employ a number of devices to circumvent the
elective share, including the creation of a funded inter vivos trust with
retained rights.Iu1 Courts have allowed these transfers, even if the testator's sole purpose in making the transfer was to avoid the statutory
share.126 However, a court might find the transfer illusory or testamentary
if the transfer effectively reduced the estate subject to the elective share but
allowed the testator to retain lifetime control over the trust property.'2 7 In
such a situation, a court may invalidate, for elective share purposes, an
otherwise valid nontestamentary transfer that would cause the surviving
spouse to receive less than a fair share of the testator's property. 121
The theories employed by courts to test the validity of avoidance
attempts vary in nomenclature and design. However, many of these theories
would apparently yield similar results because they share similar elements
and uphold the underlying policies of fairness and equity. The opinions have
variously categorized the tests using terms such as "illusory," "intent to
defraud," "present donative intent," "colorable," and "flexible standard."
b. The Illusory TransferDoctrine
The New York case of Newman v. Dore,2 9 one of the two cases cited
by Seifert, utilized the illusory transfer test. In Newman the testator made
a deathbed transfer of all of his assets into a revocable trust three days
before his death, but reserved the right to receive income. 30 Rather than

123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id. at 754.
Id. at 755.
Id. at 756-57.
Id. at 756.
Id. at 757.
Id.; see infra part lI.C.4.g.

129. 9 N.E.2d 966 (N.Y. 1937).
130. Id. at 967.
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examining the testator's intent in disposing of his property, the court focused
on whether the transfer was real or illusory, a distinction determined by the
amount of control retained by the testator.' Thus, the illusory transfer
test scrutinizes the intent of the testator to relinquish ownership of the
property instead of the testator's possible intent to defraud the surviving
2
3

spouse. 1

c. The Intent to Defraud Test
A test employed by a minority of jurisdictions examines the testator's
intent to deprive the surviving spouse of the elective share. The case most
cited to illustrate the subjective intent to defraud test is Rose v. St. Louis
Union Trust Co.133 In Rose the court found the inter vivos trust valid, but
remanded the case and suggested that the lower court use the following
factors to determine whether the decedent had a fraudulent intent: (1)
whether the settlor intended to deprive the surviving spouse of the elective
share; (2) whether the settlor's death was imminent at the time of the trust's
creation; (3) the proportion of the decedent's property placed in the trust;
(4) the estate otherwise left to the spouse; (5) lack of consideration for the
creation of the trust; and (6) the spouse's lack of knowledge about the
134
trust.
The subjective intent to defraud test has not fared well in the courts. As
one commentator noted:
IT]he intent-to-defraud test is a virtual playground of difficulties and
weaknesses. Neither the courts nor the commentators speak kindly of
it .... [S]ubjective intent to defraud is extremely difficult to prove,
especially when the settlor is deceased. Good evidence is hard to come
by, and the parties to35the dispute are long past the point of being
objective or unbiased.1
The objective intent to defraud test is an alternative test that seeks to
avoid the uncertainties of the subjective intent to defraud test. In Hanke v.
Hanke316 the court held that the well-established rule in New Hampshire
is: "If the spouse makes the transfer for the purpose of depriving the

131. Id. at 968-69.
132. Because the Seifert court relied on the illusory transfer doctrine espoused in
Newman, this Article more completely considers the application of this theory infra part

II.C.4.h.
133. 253 N.E.2d 417 (111. 1969) (relying on Missouri law).

134. See id. at 419-20.
135. McClellan, supra note 76, at 619 (footnotes omitted).
136. 459 A.2d 246 (N.H. 1983).
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss2/3
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surviving spouse of his or her rights, the transfer is invalid. " 13 By
focusing on the "objective manifestation of the transferor's intent," 3 ' the
court sought to avoid the tendency of the subjective intent test to "create
doubt about all transfers made by a spouse. ""' The objective manifestation of the transferor's intent is to be determined by a consideration of "the
circumstances surrounding the transfer, 'including the pecuniary circumstances of the parties when the conveyance is made, the consideration
received[,] . . . the relationship of the parties to the transaction, and other
relevant facts.'"14 0 The Hanke court adopted the objective test because the
court believed that the test best reconciles the competing policies of
protecting surviving spouses and maintaining freedom of testation.1 '
d. The PresentDonative Intent Test
The present donative intent test appears in Johnson v. La Grange State
Bank. 2 In La Grange the testator and her husband had been married for
36 years. The testator's husband was a millionaire, but he had been
generous to her and had provided her with shrewd investment advice. After
discovering that she had cancer, the testator created an inter vivos trust and
funded it with virtually all of her assets. She named herself as trustee,
reserved the lifetime rights to receive income and to invade principal, and
maintained the right to revoke the trust. Upon the testator's death, the
successor trustee was to distribute the corpus to the testator's side of the
family.'43 Although the testator apparently retained about as much control
and ownership over the property as possible, the court found that she did not
defraud her surviving husband, from whom she had separated, of his marital
share." The La Grange court held "that an inter vivos transfer of property is valid as against the marital rights of the surviving spouse unless the
transaction is tantamount to a fraud as manifested by the absence of donative
intent to make a conveyance of a present interest in the property conveyed. "145
Unlike the illusory transfer test, the La Grange test considers the degree
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id. at 248.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Hamm v. Piper, 201 A.2d 125, 127 (N.H. 1964) (omission in

original)).
141. Id. The court expressly rejected the illusory transfer test enunciated in Newman,
but invited the legislature, if dissatisfied, to adopt another test. Id. at 248-49.
142. 383 N.E.2d 185 (Ill. 1978).
143. Id. at 188-89.

144. See id. at 195.
145. Id. at 194.
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of the transferor's retained powers to be "'far from controlling on [the]
issue'" of present donative intent.' 46 The present donative intent test
focuses not on what the transferor retained, but instead on the settlor's intent
"'to presently part with some of the incidents of ownership in the [property]. '"47 Although it may be difficult to name the interest that passed when
the settlor established the trust, there is no "'reason for so doing so long as
it passed. . immediately upon the creation of the trust.'"48 The court
stated:
The fact cannot be denied that as trustee of a revocable trust [the
testator] retained a significant degree of control over the trust assets.
However, the form of control which the donor retains over the trust
does not make it invalid. In addition, it is well established that the
retention by the settlor of the power to revoke, even when coupled with
the reservation of a49life interest in the trust property, does not render the
trust inoperative.
Because the testator had retained a life interest in the trust, the court
considered other equitable factors to determine whether the testator had the
requisite donative intent to transfer a present interest to the remaindermen.150 For example, the surviving spouse knew that his wife had contacted her attorneys to prepare a trust and a will. 51 In addition, the testator
knew that the surviving spouse had considerable independent means of
support. 5 2 The court also noted the testator's concern for the welfare of
the remaindermen of the trust. Significantly, the court observed:
The declaration of trust immediately created an equitable interest in the
beneficiaries, although the enjoyment of the interest was postponed until
[the testator's] death and subject to her power of revocation. This,
however, did not make the transfer illusory. And the power of control
that she had as trustee was not an irresponsible power; she was charged
with a fiduciary duty in respect to the beneficiaries' interest, and her

146. Id. at 193 (quoting Toman v. Svoboda, 349 N.E.2d 668, 675 (111.
App. Ct.
1976)).
147. Id. at 194 (quoting Farkas v. Williams, 125 N.E.2d 600, 603 (I11.1955)).
148. Id. (quoting Farkas, 125 N.E.2d at 603).
149. Id. at 195 (citations omitted).
150. The factors were delineated in Toman, 349 N.E.2d at 673. See infra notes 161163 and accompanying text. In addition, these factors are similar to those used in the
Hanke court's objective intent to defraud test. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
151. La Grange, 383 N.E.2d at 195 (discussing the related issue of whether grounds
existed for imposition of a constructive trust).
152. Id.
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss2/3
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management and administration of the assets in trust
could only be
53
exercised in accordance with the terms of the trust.'
Furthermore, the court found that the testator had parted with an interest
during her life because the trust provided a complete scheme in the event the
testator became disabled.1 54 Finally, the court determined that the testator
never "exercised any of her reserved powers to deplete the trust assets.""' s
Thus, the court concluded that the testator did not intend to defraud her
56
surviving husband of his marital share by establishing the trust.
Unlike the illusory transfer test, the present donative intent test does not
place other nonprobate transfers in jeopardy. As one commentator stated:
The present-donative intent test emphasizes the donor's intent to
make a real and present gift. The key is to determine whether any real
interest passed to the transferee at the time of the transfer. If the transfer
was by a valid deed it would easily pass the test and be able to resist the
claims of the elective share. In applying this test to joint bank accounts
the Illinois Supreme Court ... said that the mere creation of a joint
tenant account was sufficient evidence of the donative intent of the donor
57
to make the transfer legitimate.1
This commentator also indicated that POD accounts 8 and Totten
trusts 59 would be upheld under the present donative intent test if they
were legitimate nonprobate transfers under state law.' 6
In Toman v. Svoboda161 the Illinois Court of Appeals considered a
number of factors to determined whether the testator intended to defraud the
surviving spouse of the marital share. Those factors included: the secretive
manner of the testator, the temporal proximity of the gift to the testator's
death, the comparative values of the testator's estate and the surviving

153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. See id.
157. McClellan, supra note 76, at 627 (citations omitted).
158. A POD account is an account that is payable on the death of an account holder.
E.g., UNIF. PROB. CODE § 6-201, 8 U.L.A. 308 (Supp. 1993).
159. A Totten trust is commonly defined as a bank account payable to a beneficiary
upon the death of the account holder-trustee, who retains until his or her death the right
to revoke the account in whole or in part by withdrawing funds from the account. See
In re Totten, 71 N.E. 748 (N.Y. 1904). South Carolina recognizes the Totten trust by
statute. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 62-6-103 to -104 (Law. Co-op. 1987 & Supp. 1992).
160. See McClellan, supra note 76, at 627.
161. 349 N.E.2d 668 (111. App. Ct. 1976).
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spouse's net worth, and any other factor indicative of the testator's
intent. 162 To ensure that the testator's donative intent was not merely
testamentary, the Toman court imposed special scrutiny for transfers in
which the testator reserved a life estate.163 Similarly, in In re Estate of
Puetz'64 the court cited Toman and employed special scrutiny for reserved
life estates to determine whether the testator lacked present donative
intent. 165
e. The Colorable Transfer Test
In both La Grange and Puetz the court described the colorable standard
by distinguishing it from the illusory test. An illusory transfer is one in
which the transferor takes back all that was given.' 66 In contrast, a
colorable transfer appears absolute, but is not because of some secret or tacit
underlying agreement between the transferor and the transferee. 67
f. The Flexible Standard Test
In Johnson v. Farmers & Merchants Bank 68 the court utilized a
flexible standard test that considered all of the pertinent factors in weighing
the equities of each individual case. 69 The court noted that the widow's
estate was modest and that she was unaware of her husband's dispositive
scheme. 170 Also important was the understanding between the testator and
his trustee that allowed the testator to dispose of the assets in his trust

162.
163.
164.
165.

See id. at 673.
Id. at 677.
521 N.E.2d 1277 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1988).
See id. at 1280-82. The Puetz court examined the Toman factors, as well as

whether the testator actually exercised any of his retained lifetime rights. The court
remanded the case for a determination of these questions of fact. See id. Although
claiming to use the older Illinois retention-of-ownership test, the court in Johnson v. La
Grange State Bank, 383 N.E.2d 185 (Ill.
1978), also relied on the Toman factors in
determining the validity of an inter vivos trust. Id. at 193-94.
166. Puetz, 521 N.E.2d at 1280 (quoting La Grange, 383 N.E.2d at 193); see Edward

A. Smith, Comment, The PresentStatus of "Illusory" Trusts-The Doctrine of Newman
v. Dore Brought Down to Date, 44 MICH. L. REv. 151, 155 (1945).
167. Puetz, 521 N.E.2d at 1280 (quoting La Grange, 383 N.E.2d at 193); Smith,
supra note 166, at 153.

168. 379 S.E.2d 752 (W.Va. 1989).
169. Id. at 759. The facts of Johnson are discussed supra text accompanying notes
122-124.
170. Johnson, 379 S.E.2d at 759-60.
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss2/3
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without incurring the usual trustee's commission.'71 The testator had
executed, concurrently with the trust agreement, a letter that indicated an
independent agreement to create a condition precedent to the trust. 72 The
court found that the letter, coupled with the deposition testimony of the
testator's attorney, demonstrated the testator's intent to retain control over
the assets in the trust because the testator refused to execute the trust
agreement until he received assurance about the trustee's waiver of
commissions.' 73
The Johnson court recognized the rule that mere retention of the right
174
to revoke does not create a presumption that the transfer was illusory.
However, the absence of a presumption does not prevent the ultimate finding
that the transfer was illusory. The court noted that the testator "was able to
enjoy the benefits of his trust arrangement without any apparent constraints
or burdens." 75 Accordingly, the court found that the testator "transferred
virtually all of his property into an inter vivos trust with full knowledge of
the fact that such a transfer would substantially diminish the share of his
estate that his wife could receive upon his death." 76 Although the court
acknowledged the ability of a testator to effectively avoid the elective share
through a transfer made solely for that purpose, 177 the Johnson decision
conclusion about the testator's
appeared to rest ultimately on the court's
7
knowledge of the results of his transfer. 1
Perhaps Seifert is most like Johnson. Arguably, the Seifert court could
have used the Johnson flexible standard test to include the trust assets for
elective share purposes. However, the South Carolina statute specifically
the court to use
limiting the elective share to probate assets may have7forced
9
the resulting trust theory to obtain its desired result.

171. Id. at 760.
172. See id.
173. Id. at 760. The control retained in Johnson is reminiscent of Seifert. See Seifert
v. Southern Nat'l Bank, 305 S.C. 353, 355, 409 S.E.2d 337, 338 (1991).
174. See Johnson, 379 S.E.2d at 761 (citing Davis v. KB & T Co., 309 S.E.2d 45,
46 (V. Va. 1983)). Unlike the Seifert court, which did not even expressly recognize that
a revocable trust may be valid, the Johnson court admitted that a presumption exists in
favor of validity. See id.
175. Id. at 762. The court noted that the testator's control over the trust was so
complete that he attempted to negotiate the sale of the trust's single largest asset without
the trustee's participation or knowledge. Id.

176. Id.
177. See id. at 756-57.
178. See id. at 762.
179. See supra note 99.
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g. Is There a Bright Line?
The decisions discussed above profess to use different tests that seem
to incorporate similar elements."8 For example, in reciting the factors of
the Toman present donative intent test, the Johnson opinion recognized that
these are essentially the same factors that may be relevant in an application
of the intent to defraud test."8' The influence of the illusory trust doctrine
is also evident in the present donative intent test. Like the illusory trust
doctrine, the present donative intent test focuses upon "real" gifts-those
made without improper retention of control by the donor that could render
an otherwise valid inter vivos transfer "quasi-testamentary" and justify a
surviving spouse's claim upon the property. Moreover, Puetz equated the
lack of present donative intent with an illusory or colorable transaction that
was a fraud on the marital share." 8
Despite the use of comparable tests, courts have reached disparate
results when faced with analogous fact situations. For instance, both La
Grange and Johnson involved the creation of inter vivos trusts in which the
testators retained substantial, if not absolute, control and ownership rights.
Yet, the Johnson court found fraud on the marital share, 3 but the La
Grange court did not."8 La Grange employed the present donative intent
test," while Johnson incorporated that consideration into its flexible
standard approach.' 86 The different results in these opinions could be
explained, however, by the wealth of the surviving spouse in La Grange
coupled with the testator's failure actually to exert control over the trust
assets despite her retention of control.'
Although discrepancies will arise whenever courts make decisions on
a case-by-case basis, certain constants exist. In the decisions discussed
above, each of the courts looked at the testator's intent either to defraud the
spouse or to retain excessive control, or both. Furthermore, each court

180. All of the decisions acknowledge the ability of a testator to avoid the elective
share, yet warn that the ability is not unfettered. One problem that quickly emerges from

a comparison of these cases and theories is the lack of a safe harbor, either for those
wishing to circumvent the elective share or for those attempting to invalidate transfers
intended to bypass that entitlement.
181. Johnson, 379 S.E.2d at 758-59 (citing Toman v. Svoboda, 349 N.E.2d 668, 673
(Ill. App. Ct. 1976)).
182. See In re Estate of Puetz, 521 N.E.2d 1277, 1280 (IIl. App. Ct. 1988).
183. Johnson, 379 S.E.2d at 761-62.
184. Johnson v. La Grange State Bank, 383 N.E.2d 185, 195 (Ill. 1978).
185. La Grange, 383 N.E.2d at 194.
186. See Johnson, 379 S.E.2d at 759-60.
187. See La Grange, 383 N.E.2d at 195. Nevertheless, the facts of these two cases are
sufficiently similar to confuse anyone searching for a safe harbor.
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss2/3
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considered fairness and equity to some extent, regardless of whether the
court admitted to it.' Thus, the validity of an individual transaction may
rest upon the interrelation of the facts involved. A court may invalidate an
inter vivos trust if the testator retaining the benefits has a less-wealthy
spouse; yet, the same court may uphold a trust created by a testator for the
sole purpose of avoiding the elective share if the testator does not actually
exercise any of the retained control. Accordingly, the establishment of a
bright-line test is unlikely.
h. Seifert Under the Illusory Transfer Test
The Seifert court relied on only two cases to support its use of the
8 9 and the
illusory transfer test: the North Carolina case of Moore v. Jones"
New York case of Newman v. Dore."9 The court's reliance on these cases
may not have been justified because the applicable elective share statutes in
North Carolina and New York did not specifically limit the elective share
to probate assets. 9 ' By contrast, however, the SCPC specifically limits the
elective share to the "probate estate. " " Even if the specific restrictive
language of the South Carolina elective share statutes does not render the
use of the illusory transfer test inadvisable, the test may be an inappropriate
way to determine the viability of any elective share avoidance technique.
The Newman test to establish whether an otherwise valid inter vivos
transfer is void for the purposes of the elective share examines whether the
challenged transfer is "real or illusory."193 As applied, it "is essentially
the test of whether the [testator] has in good faith divested himself of
ownership of his property or has made an illusory transfer."'"' In Newman
the testator created, from his deathbed three days before his death, a
revocable trust in which he retained a life interest in the entire income. The
trust made the trustee's powers "'subject to the settlor's control during his
life,'" and exercisable "'in such manner only as the settlor shall from time

188. For example, even the Hanke court, which followed the strict intent to defraud
test, contemplated such equitable circumstances as the relative wealth of the parties in
determining the testator's intent. See Hanke v. Hanke, 459 A.2d 246, 248 (N.H. 1983).
189. 261 S.E.2d 289 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980), cited in Seifert, 305 S.C. at 355, 409
S.E.2d at 338.
190. 9 N.E.2d 966 (N.Y. 1937), cited in Seifert, 305 S.C. at 355, 409 S.E.2d at 338.
191. See Moore, 261 S.E.2d at 291 (discussing North Carolina's elective share
statute); Newman, 9 N.E.2d at 966-67 (discussing New York elective share statute in
effect at time of decision).
192. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 62-2-201 to -202 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992), discussed
supra note 58.
193. Newman, 9 N.E.2d at 969.
194. Id.
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to time direct in writing. ' "" The New York court applied the illusory
transfer test to void the trust only for the purpose of determining the
surviving spouse's elective share.'
Other states have refused to apply the Newman illusory transfer test to
invalidate, for elective share purposes, a trust otherwise valid under the
state's law of trusts or contracts." 9 For example, Ohio, which previously
advocated the illusory transfer test,19 rejected the test in Smyth v. Cleveland Trust Co."9 The court acknowledged that the illusory transfer test
was illogical:
"It seems incongruous indeed that a trust may be valid giving the
trustee title to and a vested interest in the trust property and yet the
settlor's widow, upon electing not to take under his will, may be
accorded the right by judicial fiat to claim a 'distributive share' of the
trust property under the statutes of descent and distribution."2" °
Similarly, in Leazenby v. Clinton County Bank & Trust Co.20' the
Indiana Court of Appeals adopted the Smyth court's reasoning and rejected
the Newman illusory transfer concept. 2 2 The Leazenby court stated that
its main reason for rejecting Newman was the lack of clarity concerning the
"degree of dominion and control. . . necessary to partially invalidate the
trust in this way."' The court complained that while
[t]he present vagueness in the law in regard to inter vivos transactions
gives latitude to judges in finding a result beneficial to the particular
surviving spouse consonant with that state's policy[,] . . . uncertainty
imposes a hardship on conscientious settlors and beneficiaries204who
cannot be certain which good faith arrangements will be upheld.

195. Id. at 968 (quoting trust agreements).
196. Id. at 969-70.
197. See supra part II.C.4.a.-g.
198. Bolles v. Toledo Trust Co., 58 N.E.2d 381, 390-91 (Ohio 1944) (adopting the

illusory transfer test of Newman to void, for the purposes of the elective share statute,
two inter vivos trusts in which the testator retained a life interest and the power to
withdraw principal, as well as the power to alter, amend, or revoke), overruledby Smyth
v. Cleveland Trust Co., 179 N.E.2d 60 (Ohio 1961).
199. 179 N.E.2d 60 (Ohio 1961).

200. Id. at 68 (quoting Harris v. Harris, 72 N.E.2d 378, 383 (Ohio 1947) (Zimmerman, J., dissenting)).
201. 355 N.E.2d 861 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976).
202. Id. at 865 (citing Smyth, 179 N.E.2d at 68).

203. Id. at 864.
204. Id.
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss2/3

32

PROBATEofCODE
SOUTH CAROLINA
Medlin: Result-Oriented
Interpretations
the South Carolina Probate Cod

1993]

In fact, the Newman court explicitly declined "to formulate any general test
of how far a settlor must divest himself of his interest in the trust property
to render the conveyance more than illusory. " '
The Newman illusory transfer test has also been attacked by scholars. As
Professor Macdonald noted:
[There is another unfortunate aspect of the illusory transfer doctrine.... The ensuing confusion in the case-law [under the illusory
transfer test] certainly does nothing to further the basic legislative
policy. If anything, it constitutes a hazard for the husband who attempts
to make an equitable inter vivos distribution to his children, particularly
if the children are of a prior marriage. In other words, the estate planner
cannot6 rely on the courts to say what they mean, or to mean what they
say.

2

0

Furthermore, commentators have criticized the Newman test "as being
illogical because most courts have held that the retention of the power to
revoke a trust, when the spouse has made a transfer in trust, is not generally
excessive control so as to make the transfer illusory. "2'7 This reproach of
the logic of the illusory transfer test has arisen because the illusory transfer
test "effect[s] an unrealistic dedmphasis of the power to revoke."20"
The illusory transfer test voids a trust for the purpose of the elective
share if "the power to revoke and the retention of income for life are
combined with extreme control over administration."2" Although the
power to revoke gives the settlor the ultimate power to control the trustee,
the power to revoke by itself should not void the trust for the purposes of
the elective share statute.2"' If the power to revoke-the ultimate retained
power-is insufficient to invalidate a revocable inter vivos trust, then any

205. Newman v. Dore, 9 N.E.2d 966, 969 (N.Y. 1937).
206. MACDONALD, supra note 76, at 93-94.
207. Hanke v. Hanke, 459 A.2d 246,248-49 (N.H. 1983) (citing MACDONALD, supra

note 76, at 90).
MACDONALD, supra note 76, at 90.
209. Id.
210. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 57 cmt. c (1957).

208.

Thus, if it is provided by statute that the wife of a testator shall be entitled to a certain portion of his estate of which she cannot be deprived by

will ... a married man can nevertheless transfer his property inter vivos in
trust and his widow will not be entitled on his death to a share of the property
so transferred, even though he reserves a life estate and power to revoke or
modify the trust.
Id. (citation omitted); see also SCOTT & FRATCHER, supranote 62, § 57.2, at 140 ("The

trend of the modem authorities is to uphold an inter vivos trust no matter how extensive
may be the powers over the administration of the trust reserved by the settlor.").
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secondary powers retained by the testator likewise should not invalidate the
trust.

211

D. Problems in the Wake of Seifert
1. Destruction of Dispositive Scheme
Arguably, the Seifert court destroyed the decedent's entire dispositive
scheme by completely invalidating the revocable trust instead of merely
requiring the inclusion of the trust assets to the extent necessary to calculate
the spouse's elective share.212 The decedent's clear intent was to limit his
spouse to a life interest in any assets that she would receive213 and to
provide for any other assets to pass equally to his two daughters.2 14 He
attempted to accomplish his dispositive plan by executing a revocable trust
and a will, which poured over the residue of his probate estate into the
215
trust.

If, as the court insisted, the revocable trust failed, then the residue of
his probate estate would lapse because the residuary clause attempted to
pour the probate estate over into the revocable trust, which, having failed,
did not exist. The residuary clause did not name an alternative devisee in the
event the revocable trust failed;216 consequently, the residuary devise
would lapse, 217 and the decedent's probate estate would pass by partial
intestacy to his heirs. 218 Because the failure of the revocable trust would
cause the assets intended for the trust to be included in the decedent's
probate estate,21 9 the assets of the failed trust would be included in the
property passing by partial intestacy because of the lapse."0 Under the
applicable South Carolina intestacy statutes, the widow would take half of

211. See supranotes 76-78 and accompanying text.
212. See Seifert v. Southern Nat'l Bank, 305 S.C. 353, 357, 409 S.E.2d 337, 339
(1991). A revocable inter vivos trust is often an integral part of a testator's total estate
plan. See, e.g., Miller v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 637 P.2d 75 (Okla. 1981).
213. The decedent's intent to limit his spouse to a life interest in any assets that she
received was so strong that he took the unusual step of granting only a life interest in the
personal property transferred to her. See Record at 35.
214. See id. at 16-18.
215. Id. at 36.
216. See id.
217. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-510(a) (Law. Co-op. 1987) (providing that the
revocation or termination of a trust before the testator's death causes the devise to lapse).

218. See id. § 62-2-604.
219. See Seifert, 305 S.C. at 357, 409 S.E.2d at 339.
220. Except, of course, to the extent they are used to satisfy the spouse's elective
share claim.
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss2/3
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the property passing by partial intestacy, and the daughters would divide the
other half equally. 1 Thus, under this scenario, the widow would receive
more than her one-third elective share.'
Moreover, because the trust had failed, the widow would take her share
outright, rather than in trust for life as intended by the decedent's estate
plan. This result would also contradict the legislature, which clearly
intended that the minimum elective share may be satisfied by limiting the
surviving spouse to a life estate in one-third of the probate estate.'
Section 62-2-207 of the SCPC provides that the elective share amount is
offset by any interest in probate assets received by the surviving spouse if
that interest qualifies for the federal estate tax marital deduction. 4 Section
62-2-207 further provides that, in valuing interests for purposes of offsetting
the elective share, a beneficial interest to the surviving spouse that
qualifies for the marital 6 deduction is offset against the elective share at the
full value of the trust. 1
For example, a decedent who dies with a probate estate valued at
$300,000, after deducting expenses and claims,

7

can satisfy the elective

share by devising to the surviving spouse a life interest in a trust containing
$100,000. The life estate interest qualifies for the federal estate tax marital
deduction and triggers the offset provision of SCPC section 62-2-207. The
elective share for a $300,000 probate estate is $100,000. Under section
62-2-207, the elective share amount is offset by the value of the life estate
in trust, which is equal to the value of the trust itself (i.e., $100,000)
because the life interest is not actuarially valued. 9
Obviously, a life interest in property is not worth the same as a fee

221. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 62-2-101 to -103 (Law. Co-op. 1987 & Supp. 1992).
222. The lapse may not occur if a court applies the theory of incorporation by
reference. See id. § 62-2-509 (Law. Co-op. 1987).
223. See id. § 62-2-207 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992).
224. Id. Generally, a life estate passing from the decedent to the surviving spouse outright or in trust qualifies for the federal estate tax marital deduction, even if the spouse
cannot control the disposition of the remainder interest. See I.R.C. § 2056 (1988 &
Supp. M 1991).
225. Le., an interest in trust.
226. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-207(a) ("For purposes of this subsection, the value of
the electing spouse's beneficial interest in any property which would qualify for the
federal estate tax marital deduction pursuant to Section 2056 of the Internal Revenue
Code, as amended, shall be computed at the full value of any such qualifying property. . . ."). The legislature chose a fixed method of valuing the offset rather than relying
on an actuarial value on a case-by-case basis.
227. See id. § 62-2-202.
228. See id. §§ 62-2-201 to -202.
229. See supra note 226.
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simple absolute in the same property. Thus, SCPC section 62-2-207
provides one method of partially avoiding payment of the full elective share
amount. By devising to the surviving spouse only a life interest in one-third
of the probate estate, the decedent can satisfy the elective share with something actually worth less than one-third of the probate estate while retaining
control over the disposition of the remainder interest. 2 0 However, by
invalidating the revocable trust, the Seifert court ignored the decedent's
intent to limit his surviving spouse's interest to a life estate."
2. JeopardizingRevocable Trust Validity
From a broader perspective, Seifert may jeopardize the validity of
revocable trusts created by married settlors. Even if Seifert is limited to a
narrow application-an "illusory" revocable inter vivos trust is subject to
invalidation if the settlor is married at death-whether a revocable trust is
illusory is a factual determination to be decided on a case-by-case basis.32
If the court decides that the trust is illusory, then the trust fails. If the court
relies on the resulting trust theory, the better-reasoned view is that the trust
is invalid from the moment the settlor attempts to create it, and, thus, the
trust never attains validity. 33 Yet, this determination is not made until the
settlor dies and the surviving spouse brings an elective share claim. Consequently, any married settlor who attempts to create a revocable inter vivos
trust faces the possibility that an elective share dispute will cause the trust
to be invalidated retroactively after the settlor's death. 4

230. See id. § 62-2-207.
231. Complete invalidation of a revocable trust can render examples even worse than

Seifert. For example, Testator, T, creates a revocable inter vivos trust, funded with most
of his assets, approximately $1.5 million. Upon Y's death, the trust provides for distribution of the trust property to T's sister, who could use the assets for medical care. T's will
contains a pour-over residuary clause similar to the will in Seifert. T dies survived by a
spouse and no issue. If the court followed Seifert and determined that the trust failed so
that the trust assets were included in T's probate estate, the residuary devise would lapse
and pass by partial intestacy. Under the SCPC, I's spouse would be the sole heir and

would take the entire estate, while Y's sister would take nothing. See id. §§ 62-2-102 to 103 (Law. Co-op. 1987 & Supp. 1992). This would be the result even if Y's spouse were
independently wealthy.
232. See Seifert v. Southern Nat'l Bank, 305 S.C. 353, 355-56, 409 S.E.2d 337, 338
(1991). According to the Seifert court, the "illusoriness" of a trust depends upon the

amount of control the decedent evidenced while alive. See id. Hence, the determination
that a trust is illusory can only be made on a case-by-case basis.
233. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.

234. This uncertainty exists even if the settlor's estate plan at the time of the trust's
attempted creation leaves the surviving spouse at least the minimum elective share

amount because subsequent events may render the amount insufficient to satisfy the
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss2/3
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The possible retroactive invalidation of a revocable inter vivos trust
causes concern not only for the settlor and the intended beneficiaries of the
trust, but also for the trustee. If a trustee has been administering a trust that
is later invalidated, questions may arise about the propriety of the putative
trustee acting without the authority of a valid trust. The putative trustee
could be held liable as a trustee de son tort for acting as if it had authority
to administer the trust even though a court subsequently determined that the
trustee did not."
3. Invalidation of Other Nonprobate Transfers
The rationale of the Seifert opinion could be used to invalidate other,
similar nonprobate transfers. Precedent for such a claim occurred in North
Carolina in the wake of Moore v. Jones. 6 In In re Estate of Francis237
the North Carolina Court of Appeals found that the value of two bank
accounts held by the testatrix and her sister as joint tenants with right of
survivorship were properly included in the decedent's "net estate" for
purposes of determining the surviving spouse's right to elect against the
will.
The court relied upon the broad language of Moore to find that "the
testatrix retained complete control over the assets of the bank account until
the moment of her death. "238 The Francis court also observed that "the
public policy expressed in the dissent statutes [would] be served by
including in the net estate for purposes of the dissent statute the value of the
bank accounts with right of survivorship in appellant."" The Supreme
Court of North Carolina reversed, declining "to extend the rationale of
Moore to bank accounts with right of survivorship."240 The court rejected
the inclusion of joint bank accounts in the decedent's net estate to avoid "an
expansive interpretation of the dissent statutes."241
In Seifert the South Carolina Supreme Court adopted the broad
reasoning of Moore; 42 however, the language of the Seifert opinion offers
elective share. Accordingly, if the surviving spouse pursues an elective share claim after
the settlor's death, a court might examine the validity of the revocable trust. See supra
part II.C.2.
235. See, e.g., Sandpiper N. Apts., Ltd. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 680
P.2d 983, 988 (Okla. 1984).
236. 261 S.E.2d 289 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980).
237. 381 S.E.2d 484 (N.C. Ct. App. 1989), rev'd, 394 S.E.2d 150 (N.C. 1990).
238. Id. at 487 (citing Moore, 261 S.E.2d 289).
239. Id.
240. In re Estate of Francis, 394 S.E.2d 150, 157 (N.C. 1990), rev'g 381 S.E.2d 484
(N.C. Ct. App. 1989).
241. Id.
242. Seifert v. Southern Nat'l Bank, 305 S.C. 353, 355, 409 S.E.2d 337, 338 (1991)
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no rational prospect for distinguishing revocable trusts from other nonprobate assets. By holding that "nothing in §§ 62-2-201 and 62-2-202
prohibits the proceeds of a trust, once declared invalid or illusory from
being included in the probate estate, " ' the court opened the door for the
argument that nothing in those sections prohibits other nonprobate transfers
from being included in the probate estate if such attempted transfers are
determined to be illusory. The exception stated in Seifert is so broad that it
renders meaningless the word "probate" in sections 62-2-210 and 62-2-202.
The court's determination that there is "very little difference between
[the] situation [in Seifert] and one in which an otherwise valid trust
fails" 2' can apply equally to joint tenancies with right of survivorship, life
insurance policies if the insured predeceases the beneficiary, and other
nonprobate transfers. A recent article acknowledges the potentially broad
applicability of the "illusory transfer" test:
If property is transferred by deed there is normally a total loss of legal
control. Thus, one would expect the transfer to pass the test and stand
up against the claims of the surviving spouse's elective share. At the
other end of the spectrum are the revocable inter vivos trust, the P.O.D
account, and the Totten trust. These can be grouped together because the
one thing they all share is their total revocability. If the illusory transfer
test is logically applied, one would expect all three to fail the test. Thus,
a transfer made by any of these three methods would be subject to the
claims of the surviving spouse's elective share. Somewhere in between
are the joint tenancies in land and joint tenancy bank accounts. In each
of these the grantor has divested himself of some of his power and
control over the assets, but he has also retained some. The funds in a
joint account are relatively easy to draw out and dispose of, but the joint
interest in a piece of real property is much less so. The outcome
here
245
would depend on the supporting facts and on the jurisdiction.
Unfortunately, the Seifert court neglected to consider the effect its decision
might have on other types of nonprobate transfers.
4. Increased Litigation
The Seifert decision creates the potential for a tsunami of litigation to
determine not only whether every revocable trust is subject to the elective
share, but also whether other nonprobate assets similarly are. The Seifert

(citing Moore, 261 S.E.2d 289).

243. Id.
244. Id. at 356, 409 S.E.2d at 339.
245. McClellan, supranote 76, at 626-27 (emphasis added).
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss2/3
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court held that a "trust, once declared invalid or illusory," may be included
in the probate estate for purposes of the elective share.246 Courts will now
have to determine whether a trust is invalid or illusory in every future case
in which a surviving spouse claims that a trust's assets should be subject to
the elective share. Moreover, courts will have to apply the Seifert analysis
to determine on a case-by-case basis whether other nonprobate assets are
also subject to the elective share.24 This potential flood of litigation could
be avoided by honoring the legislature's clear intent to subject only probate
assets to the elective share and not to include otherwise valid nonprobate
transfers such as revocable trusts.
E. Section 62-7-112: A Curefor Seifert?
South Carolina estate planning and probate practitioners expressed
considerable concern about the implications of the Seifert decision. In
response to these concerns, the general assembly enacted a statute in 1992
with the purpose of at least clarifying that revocable trusts are otherwise
valid despite being "invalidated" only for purposes of calculating the
elective share.24 The statute, codified as SCPC section 62-7-112, provides:
A revocable inter vivos trust may be created either by declaration of
trust or by a transfer of property and is not rendered invalid because the
trust creator retains substantial control over the trust including, but not
limited to, (1) a right of revocation, (2) substantial beneficial interests
in the trust, or (3) the power to control investments or reinvestments.
Nothing herein, however, shall prevent a finding that a revocable inter
vivos trust, enforceable for other purposes, is illusory for purposes of
determining a spouse's elective share rights under Section 62-2-201 et
seq. A finding that a revocable inter vivos trust is illusory and thus
invalid for purposes of determining a spouse's elective share rights
under Section 62-2-201 et seq. shall not render that revocable inter vivos
trust invalid, but would allow inclusion of the trust assets as part of the
probate estate of the trust creator only for the purpose of calculating the
elective share and would make available the trust assets for satisfaction
of the elective share only to the extent necessary under Section 62-2207.249

246. Seifert, 305 S.C. at 357, 409 S.E.2d at 339.
247. See supra part ll.D.3.
248. See Act of June 23, 1992, No. 475, § 3, 1992 S.C. Acts 2461, 2464 (codified
at S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-7-112 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992)).
249. S.C. CODE. ANN. § 62-7-112 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992).
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The effect of the new statute is uncertain. In one sense, it could confirm
Seifert's invalidation of the revocable trust as an elective share avoidance
technique. In such cases, however, the statute may force the courts away
from the resulting-trust/complete-invalidation theory,2s0 and towards the
more equity-oriented theories used by other jurisdictions, which invalidate
the trust only for elective share calculation, but otherwise retain the validity
of the trust.5 1
Alternatively, the statute may be interpreted to overrule Seifert. Despite
its apparent recognition of a court's ability to invalidate an illusory trust, the
statute could eviscerate the underlying premise of the Seifert opinion by
prohibiting a finding that a revocable trust is entirely invalid .1 2 The
Seifert court managed to move the decedent's assets into his probate estate
by implicitly employing the resulting trust theory to invalidate the entire
trust." s If, however, the trust were not completely invalid, it would not
fail, and the court could not use the resulting trust theory to include those
assets in the probate estate.
Although the statute does not appear to preclude reliance on other
theories to include revocable trust assets in the probate estate, any theory
that does not completely invalidate the trust would not cause the assets to be
included within the probate estate; thus, by definition, those nonprobate
assets would not be subject to the elective share. 4 A court wanting to
preclude the use of revocable trusts as an elective share avoidance device
would have to resort to one of the equity-oriented theories used by other
jurisdictions.s However, the use of one of those theories may not be
appropriate because the narrow language of the South Carolina statutes
expressly limits the elective share to probate assets."56 Perhaps the narrow
language of the statute forced the Seifert court to use the resulting trust
theory to prevent elective share avoidance with a revocable trust. If section
62-7-112 prevents such a finding in the future, then the revocable trust may
henceforth be a valid elective share avoidance device.'

250. See supra part II.3.a.
251. See supra part II.C.4.a.-g. Thus, except to the extent necessary to fulfill the
decedent's elective share obligations, these theories keep intact the rest of the decedent's
dispositive scheme. See supra part II.D.1.
252. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-7-112.
253. See supra part lI.C.3.a.
254. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 62-2-201 to -202 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992).
255. See supra part Il.C.4.a.-g.
256. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 62-2-210 to -202.
257. Other questions about the effect of § 62-7-112 persist. For example, does that

statute prevent a court from finding that nonprobate transfers other than revocable trusts
can be invalidated? See supra part II.D.3. Also, does the statute apply retroactively to
.save" revocable trusts created before its enactment? Cf. Patrick v. Parris (In re Patrick),
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss2/3
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Until the holding of Seifert and the effect of section 62-7-112 are
clarified, estate planners in South Carolina must be careful in using any type
of nonprobate transfer that might eventually become the subject of an
elective share dispute. The mindful planner should not advise a client that
any elective share avoidance technique is guaranteed to work. 8 Moreover, any will that pours over probate assets into a revocable inter vivos
trust that might be invalidated should contain an alternative provision that
expressly recreates the terms of the inter vivos trust as a testamentary trust.
Although a testamentary trust, by definition, is not an elective share avoidance technique because it will be funded with probate assets that are subject
to the elective share, at least the rest of the testator's estate plan will remain
intact. 9 To avoid liability as a trustee de son tort, trustees of revocable
trusts should insist on the inclusion of a provision in the pertinent documents
granting them authority as agents in case the trusts are later invalidated.
F. Waiving the Elective Share
In Patrick v. Parris (In re Patrick)6 the South Carolina Supreme
Court addressed some other elective share issues of first impression. The
decedent in Patrick married her husband in 1971, after the order granting
her husband a divorce from his previous wife was filed in the family court,
" ' In 1983
but before the order was filed in the circuit court.26
the decedent
and her husband separated for a year. During the separation, her husband
transferred to her his half-interest in their marital home in exchange for cash
and a note. He later wrote the decedent, indicating that he would "sign
everything over to her if she would take him back," and, upon their
reconciliation, he returned the cash.262 The decedent died in 1988,263
after the effective date of the SCPC,26 which provides for elective share

303 S.C. 559, 402 S.E.2d 664 (1991) (discussing whether the SCPC affects rights before
its effective date).
258. Except, perhaps, the "semi-avoidance" technique of limiting the spouse to a life
interest. See supra notes 223-231 and accompanying text.
259. See supra notes 217-220 and accompanying text.
260. 303 S.C. 559, 402 S.E.2d 664 (1991).
261. Id. at 561, 402 S.E.2d at 665. The family court order was signed by the family
court judge and filed in the family court on April 30, 1971. The order was filed on May
10, 1971 in the circuit court, which had transferred jurisdiction to the family court.
Apparently, the decedent married her husband between those dates. Id.
262. Id. at 562,402 S.E.2d at 665. The opinion does not indicate whether the husband
regained his half-interest in the house or forgave the note at that time.
263. Id. at 560, 402 S.E.2d at 664.
264. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-1-100(a) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992).
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rights. 2" In her will, executed in 1984, the decedent attempted to disinherit her husband, expressly limiting him to a devise of one dollar and leaving
the residue of her estate to her children. The husband timely filed an
elective share claim, which the children contested.2" The court disposed
of the children's several arguments and upheld the husband's right to the
elective share.267
The children in Patrick contended that the husband was not the
decedent's surviving spouse for elective share purposes, arguing that the
attempted marriage was invalid because it occurred before the husband's
divorce from his previous wife was effective. The court ruled, however, that
the husband's divorce was final upon the filing of the decree in the family
court, even though the marriage apparently occurred before the filing of the
decree in the circuit court.26
In addition, the court quickly disposed of the children's contention that
the grant of elective share rights to the husband contradicted the testator's
intent. The court recognized that the general assembly did not intend that the
SCPC impair any right accruing before its effective date.26 9 The court also
noted that the SCPC is intended to "mak[e] effective the intent of a decedent
in the distribution of his property."270 Nevertheless, the SCPC does
impose restrictions on a decedent's right to make testamentary dispositions.
A decedent does not enjoy the unfettered right to dispose of probate assets.
As the court observed, the elective share provisions do not recognize any
exception for a testator's contrary intent.271 Furthermore, the court

265. Id. § 62-2-201 to -207 (Law. Co-op. 1987 & Supp. 1992).
266. Patrick, 303 S.C. at 560-61, 402 S.E.2d at 664-65.
267. Id. at 561-64, 402 S.E.2d at 665-66.
268. Id. at 561, 402 S.E.2d at 665 (distinguishing Case v. Case, 243 S.C. 447, 134
S.E.2d 394 (1964)). The court's determination that the surviving spouse's prior marriage
was terminated upon the filing of the decree in family court agrees with the policy of
SCPC § 62-2-802, which requires that a divorce decree be filed to preclude a person's
qualification as a surviving spouse. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-802 (Law. Co-op.

1987). Even if the court had ruled that the marriage was terminated only upon the filing
of the decree in circuit court, the husband could have argued that he was entitled to
treatment as a surviving spouse because he and the decedent entered into a common-law

marriage after the decree was filed. See id. § 62-2-802(b)(1).
269. Patrick, 303 S.C. at 562-63, 402 S.E.2d at 665-66. Although the court's view
seems to conform with the general common-law and statutory rule that substantive rights
are determined by the law in effect at the decedent's death, it directly contradicts the
results in White v. Wilbanks, 301 S.C. 560, 393 S.E.2d 182 (1990), and McDaniel v.
Gregory, 303 S.C. 500, 401 S.E.2d 863 (1990). See infra part m.A.-B.
270. Patrick, 303 S.C. at 562, 402 S.E.2d at 665 (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-1102(b)(2) (Law. Co-op. 1987)).

271. Id. at 562, 402 S.E.2d at 666.
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concluded that the elective share provisions apply to any decedent dying
272
after the effective date of the SCPC.
1. Constitutionalityof the Elective Share
Perhaps most importantly, the Patrick court dealt with a constitutional
challenge to the elective share statutes. The children argued that the elective
share provisions violated the South Carolina Constitution, which prohibits
treating a married woman's property differently from a single woman's.273
They claimed that the elective share violates this constitutional provision by
imposing property restrictions on a married woman that are not imposed on
a single woman. A married woman cannot devise her property with
complete freedom because one-third of her probate estate is subject to the
elective share, but a single woman suffers from no such restriction.
The Patrick court admitted that the elective share statutes violate the
South Carolina Constitution.274 However, the court determined that the
"married woman's property" provision of the South Carolina Constitution
violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment275 and
is itself unconstitutional because the South Carolina Constitution does not
similarly prohibit the restriction of a married man's rights. 276 The court

272. Id. at 562-63, 402 S.E.2d at 666 (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-1-100(1) (Law.
Co-op. 1987) (amended 1987)).
273. Id. at 563, 402 S.E.2d at 666. Article XVII, § 9 of the South Carolina
Constitution provides:
The real and personal property of a woman held at the time of her
marriage, or that which she may thereafter acquire, either by gift, grant,
inheritance, devise or otherwise, shall be her separate property, and she shall
have all the rights incident to the same to which an unmarried woman or a
man is entitled. She shall have the power to contract and be contracted with
in the same manner as if she were unmarried.
S.C. CONST. art. XVII, § 9. This provision was apparently a response to the former
restrictions on married women's property rights.
274. Patrick, 303 S.C. at 563, 402 S.E.2d at 666.
275. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
276. See Patrick, 303 S.C. at 563, 402 S.E.2d at 666 (observing that a state
constitution cannot violate the United States Constitution). The Patrickdecision continued
the interesting correlation between federal equal protection and the property rights of
surviving spouses in South Carolina. The supreme court had previously held that a
surviving wife's common-law dower rights violated state and federal equal protection
provisions. See Boan v. Watson, 281 S.C. 516, 316 S.E.2d 401 (1984). The elective
share provisions were enacted partly as a response to Boan, which allowed a married
man to disinherit completely his spouse, an option already enjoyed by a married woman.
See supra note 7. As the Patrick court concluded, the elective share statutes facially
violate the "married woman's property" provision of the South Carolina Constitution.
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43

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 2 [2020], Art. 3
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:287

noted that the elective share provisions satisfy the requirements of equal
protection because they apply equally to both men and women. 2' Thus,
the court held that the South Carolina elective share provisions are valid,
even though they violate the South Carolina Constitution." 8
2. Pre-SCPCWaivers
Although the Patrickcourt effectively disposed of several elective share
arguments, it may have left open the issue of when a surviving spouse can
waive the elective share. The SCPC expressly recognizes that a spouse may
partially or completely waive elective share rights.279 The children in
Patrickclaimed that the decedent's husband waived his elective share rights
by virtue of his actions during his separation from his wife. The court
disagreed: "There is nothing in the record to indicate that [the husband]
knew he was waiving his right to the elective share. Furthermore, the
elective share provision was not in existence when [the husband] wrote the
letter in 1984 and the parties reconciled after the alleged waiver oc28 0
curred. "
This language deserves close scrutiny. The first sentence simply states
the obvious: unless the husband was psychic, he could not have known that
he was waiving his elective share rights in 1984, because the elective share
statute was not effective until 1987. From the quoted portion of the opinion,
however, it is not possible to determine whether the court rejected the
waiver argument because the decedent's acts simply failed to constitute a
waiver, or because the attempted waiver was made before the elective share
statutes became effective. The language is at least susceptible to the
inference that a waiver attempted before the SCPC's effective date is
ineffective to waive the elective share.
If this interpretation is accurate, the result seems to contradict authority
from other jurisdictions" and may make it impossible to waive the elec-

Patrick, 303 S.C. at 563, 402 S.E.2d at 666. Thus, the elective share, which originated
from a due concern for constitutional rights, violated another provision of the state
constitution. The court resolved the dilemma by holding the South Carolina constitutional
provision in violation of federal equal protection. See id.
277. Patrick, 303 S.C. at 563-64, 402 S.E.2d at 666.
278. Id. See generally S. Alan Medlin, An Overview of the Statutory Elective Share,
S.C. LAW., Nov.-Dec. 1989, at 32, 34.
279. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-204 (Law. Co-op. 1987).
280. Patrick, 303 S.C. at 562, 402 S.E.2d at 665.
281. Cf.Sogg v. Nevada State Bank, 832 P.2d 781 (Nev. 1992) (per curiam) (holding

that premarital agreement adopted prior to the state's premarital agreements act would
be enforceable if it conformed either to the requirements of the act or to the common
law). The validity of any waiver of property rights rests partly on the risk assumed by
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss2/3
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tive share with a general waiver made before the effective date of the
SCPC.3 The Patrickcourt could have based its ruling on the less disruptive and more obvious theory that the deed was not intended to be a waiver.

HI. SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS UPROOTED
A. White v. Wilbanks and Revival
The general rule governing the determination of substantive fights
obtained from a decedent applies the law in effect at the date of the
decedent's death. 3 This rule furthers the policies that the decedent's will
speaks as of the date of death and that substantive fights should be
determined with certainty and not later rescinded. South Carolina has
recognized this rule both in case law"s and by statute. 2" However, the
South Carolina appellate courts may have severely eroded, if not overturned,
this rule in the White v. Wilbanks cases. 6
In White the appellant was named executor under the decedent's 1980
will. In 1982 the decedent apparently executed a subsequent will naming
another executor. The decedent died in 1985, before the 1987 effective date

the waiving party that the waiver may include subsequently acquired property. If a court
could overturn a waiver simply because the nonwaiving party acquired property after the
waiver, so that the waiving party could claim lack of knowledge of the after-acquired
property at the time of the waiver, parties could never rely on the validity of any waiver.
If a court requires the waiving party to have actual knowledge of every asset waived,
few, if any, waivers would ever have future significance. Prenuptial agreements would
be rendered virtually meaningless.
The same logic should apply to the issue of whether a party can waive afteracquired legal rights. For a waiver to be effective, the waiving party must take the risk
that the waiver includes rights that have not yet arisen, assuming that the waiver was
intended to cover all rights that the waiving party may have in the nonwaiving party's
property. A rule to the contrary would effectively prevent the future significance of any
waiver because the parties could never be certain that all rights in the property had been
waived.
282. If this is true, attorneys who have relied on pre-SCPC waivers to include elective
share rights should strongly consider advising their clients to obtain new waivers.
283. E.g., 1 WILLIAM J. BOWE & DOUGLAS H. PARKER, PAGE ON THE LAW OF
WILLs § 3.10 (4th ed. 1960).
284. See, e.g., Boan v. Watson, 281 S.C. 516, 519, 316 S.E.2d 401, 403 (1984);
Wilson v. Jones, 281 S.C. 230, 233, 314 S.E.2d 341, 343 (1984).
285. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-1-100(b) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992).
286. White v. Wilbanks, 298 S.C. 225, 379 S.E.2d 298 (Ct. App. 1989) (White 1),
rev'd, 301 S.C. 560, 393 S.E.2d 182 (1990); White v. Wilbanks, 301 S.C. 560, 393
S.E.2d 182 (1990) (White II).
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of the SCPC,2 7 and both the original 1980 will and a copy of the 1982
will were presented to the probate court.s Because the original 1982 will
was never found, the probate court presumed that the decedent destroyed the
1982 will with the intent to revoke it. 9 Furthermore, the probate court
held that the evidence failed to establish that the testator intended to revive
the prior will by revoking the subsequent will.' On appeal, the circuit
court conducted a de novo trial before a jury,2 91 and the jury's special
verdict affirmed the decision of the probate court. 2"
The court of appeals first considered "whether the new Probate Code
should have been applied to the proceeding before the circuit court. "'
The White I court cited section 62-1-100(2) in ruling that the SCPC applies
287. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-1-100(a) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992).
288. White Ii, 301 S.C. at 561, 393 S.E.2d at 183.
289. Id. Although it is possible to probate a copy of a will when the original is
missing, the will's proponent must overcome the presumption that the testator revoked
the will by adducing sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the will was destroyed or lost
accidentally without an accompanying intent by the testator to revoke. Davis v. Davis,
214 S.C. 247, 255-56, 52 S.E.2d 192, 195-96 (1949). To revoke a will by physical act,
the testator must intend to revoke the will at the time the physical act of revocation is
committed. Without the requisite intent, the physical act alone will not suffice to revoke
the will. Id. at 261-62, 52 S.E.2d at 198-99.
290. White 11, 301 S.C. at 561, 393 S.E.2d at 183. Revival involves the situation in
which a testator executes a later will that expressly revokes an earlier will. If the testator
subsequently revokes the later will, a question about the status of the earlier will may
arise. Under pre-SCPC common law, South Carolina followed a minority rule that
revocation of the later will revives the earlier will absent some contrary intent by the
testator. See, e.g., Kollock v. Williams, 131 S.C. 352, 127 S.E. 444 (1925), superseded
by statute as stated in White 1, 298 S.C. at 228, 379 S.E.2d 299. The SCPC reversed
the common-law rule:
The revocation by acts under § 62-2-506(2) of a will made subsequent to
a former will, where the subsequent will would have revoked the former will
if the subsequent will had remained effective at the death of the testator, shall
not revive or make effective any former will unless it appears by clear,
cogent, and convincing evidence that the testator intended to revive or make
effective the former will.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-508(a) (Law. Co-op. 1987); see also White II, 301 S.C. at 561,
393 S.E.2d at 183 (applying S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-508). See generallyMedlin, supra
note 1, at 648 (discussing revival under the SCPC and the pre-SCPC common law).
291. White UI,301 S.C. at 561, 393 S.E.2d at 183. As the court of appeals noted, the
SCPC does not permit a jury trial upon an appeal to the circuit court. White I, 298 S.C.
at 227 n.1, 379 S.E.2d at 299 n.1 (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-1-308(d) (Law. Co-op.
1987)). Although not noted by the court, the SCPC does not authorize a de novo hearing
by the circuit court upon an appeal. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-1-308(d).
292. See White 1, 298 S.C. at 226-27, 379 S.E.2d at 299. The jury charge concerning
the issue of revival referred to the SCPC. See id. at 227, 379 S.E.2d at 299.
293. Id.
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss2/3
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to all proceedings pending on the effective date of the SCPC unless the
"interest of justice" requires the application of former procedure. 2" The
trial judge applied the SCPC procedure despite the previous ruling of
another circuit judge allowing, apparently in the "interest of justice," a de
novo trial before a jury on the appeal to the circuit court.2' Thus, the
circuit court employed pre-SCPC law to determine the method of hearing
the appeal, but applied SCPC procedure to otherwise govern the proceedings.
The court of appeals disagreed with the circuit court's inconsistent
ruling and opined that the subsequent circuit court judge abused his
discretion by applying SCPC procedure to the trial after the first judge had
determined that the "interest of justice" mandated application of pre-SCPC
procedure. The court of appeals reasoned that, if the "interest of justice"
test required application of pre-SCPC rules to determine the right to a de
novo jury trial, then pre-SCPC law should have applied to all aspects of the
proceeding. 296
The court added that White presented "a unique factual situation where
it would be unfair to employ a presumption not in effect at the time of the
act of destruction. " The law in effect at the time the testator presumably
revoked his subsequent will would have revived the prior will."' Under
pre-SCPC case law, the revocation of a subsequent will that had revoked a
previous will had the effect of reviving the previous will, unless a court
found clear evidence of a contrary intent. 299 The SCPC effectively reversed this presumption by providing that the revocation of a subsequent
will does not revive a prior will unless the court finds "clear, cogent, and
convincing evidence" of the testator's intent to revive." The White I
court held that the trial judge erred in charging the jury with the SCPC
revival provisions rather than with the pre-SCPC law.3 '
The executor of the first will also argued that statutory construction
should preclude a retroactive application of the SCPC. The court of appeals
rejected this contention, noting that section 62-1-100 expressly provides for

294. Id.
295. See id. at 227-28, 379 S.E.2d at 299.
296. Id.
297. Id. at 228, 379 S.E.2d at 299. In offering support for its decision, the court
strayed from the generally accepted rule that the decedent's will speaks as of the date of
death, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Bennett, 206 S.C. 402, 34 S.E.2d 678 (1945). In effect,
the decedent is deemed to know about any changes in the law that occur between the time
of execution of the will and the time of death. See id.
298. See White 1, 298 S.C. at 228, 379 S.E.2d at 299.
299. See supra note 290.
300. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-508(a) (Law. Co-op. 1987).
301. White I, 298 S.C. at 228, 379 S.E.2d at 300.
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the retroactive application of the Code unless the "interest of justice"
dictates otherwise. 3"
The court did not need to address the other issues presented because it
found error in the trial court's application of the SCPC provisions.
Nevertheless, the court considered the appellant's contention that the trial
judge committed error by ignoring a proposed charge containing the
presumption against intestacy-"that a person would not die without a
will.""33 The court of appeals noted the lack of authority for using the
presumption when the validity of a will is the issue. The court distinguished
prior cases that have used the presumption against intestacy to uphold
"descent of specific property under a will as opposed to intestate distribution."" However, the court did not believe that the presumption against
intestacy went so far as to create a presumption that a valid will existed. 5
In White II the supreme court reversed the court of appeals concerning
the application of the SCPC to revival. 6 The supreme court observed
that, although section 62-1-100(b)(2) allows the court to consider the
"interest of justice" in determining whether to apply pre-SCPC law, this
section applies only to procedural issues. 3" The court ruled that the
decision of the court of appeals overlooked the applicability of SCPC section
62-1-100(b)(5), which provides that any SCPC presumption or rule of
construction applies to instruments executed before the effective date of the
SCPC, absent a clear indication of a contrary intent.30" The White II court

302. Id. The opinion did not expressly distinguish the difference in application of § 621-100 to procedural rules and to substantive rights. Presumably, the traditional rule
should apply to substantive matters: the law in effect at the decedent's death generally
governs the determination of substantive rights. See supra note 283 and accompanying
text. The accrual of rights in the decedent's estate by the heirs or devisees should be
treated as a substantive rights issue, which, according to both the general common-law
rule and SCPC § 62-1-100(b)(4) as amended after White I, should be determined
according to the law in effect at the decedent's death. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-1100(b) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992). The White I court's treatment of the issue as
procedural rather than substantive did not affect the result because the decedent died
before the effective date of the SCPC. Even if the court had properly considered the
issue as substantive, it should have applied the pre-SCPC law in effect on the decedent's
death, which would have rendered the same result.
303. White 1, 298 S.C. at 229, 379 S.E.2d at 300.
304. Id.
305. Id. The court apparently chose to ignore SCPC § 62-2-602, which provides that
a will should be construed to pass all property that the testator owned at death. See S.C.
CODE ANN. § 62-2-602 (Law. Co-op. 1987).
306. White v. Wilbanks, 301 S.C. 560, 560-61, 393 S.E.2d 182, 183 (1990) (White
11), rev'g 298 S.C. 225, 379 S.E.2d 298 (Ct. App. 1989).
307. Id. at 562, 393 S.E.2d at 183.
308. Id.
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held that SCPC section 62-2-508 governing revival of wills clearly involves
a presumption or a rule of construction and that, because there was no
indication
of contrary intent, the SCPC rule concerning revival should ap39
ply. 0
Shortly after the White II decision, the general assembly clarified
section 62-1-100 by adding a sentence to subsection (b)(4): "Unless
otherwise provided in the Code, a substantive right in the decedent's estate
accrues in accordance with the law in effect on the date of the decedent's
death."3 ' The purpose of the amendment was to clarify further the
distinction
between substantive rights and procedural issues affected by the
311
SCPC.

The supreme court's White II decision overlooked the policy underlying
both the common-law rule and the new clarifying statutory amendment: the
decedent's will is deemed to speak at the time of the decedent's death, and
the decedent is thus presumed to know the substantive law in effect at that
time. Because virtually every decision involving a substantive rights issue
involves a rule of construction, by relying on the "construction" provision
of section 62-1-100(b)(5), 1 2 the court opened the door for application of
SCPC law in virtually every probate case, even if the decedent died before
the SCPC's effective date. Consequently, the White II opinion goes the
White I opinion one worse: it reaches the wrong result for the wrong reason.
The fallacy of the supreme court's rationale is demonstrated by the result in
the following case.
B. McDaniel v. Gregory and Lapsed Residues
31 3 the decedent died on June 18, 1986. Two
In McDaniel v. Gregory
of the residuary devisees under the decedent's will commenced an action to

309. Id.; see supra note 290.
310. Act of June 5, 1990, No. 521, pt. I, § 1, 1990 S.C. Acts 2273, 2274 (codified
as amended at S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-1-100 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992)).
311. The amendment was enacted as part of the bill proposed by the Joint Study
Committee for the SCPC. See supra note 58. The Committee recommended the
amendment to clarify that § 62-1-100 codified the common-law rule that substantive
rights should be determined by the law in effect at the date of death. Although the
supreme court's opinion in White II was filed on May 29, 1990, just prior to the
amendment's effective date, the amendment was partly precipitated by the desire to
clarify the court of appeals decision in White I, which reached the right result for the
wrong reason. Had the court of appeals treated the issue as one of substantive rights and
used the common-law (and new statutory) rule, it would have reached the right result for
the right reason.
312. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-1-100(b)(5) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992).
313. 303 S.C. 500, 401 S.E.2d 863 (1990).
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construe the will under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act3 14 after
the effective date of the SCPC" 5 A central issue was whether the SCPC
statute concerning lapsed residuary devises would apply." 6 Citing White
II, the supreme court held that the SCPC lapse statute is a rule of construction and, thus, pursuant to section 62-1-100(b)(5), applies to a will executed
before the effective date of the SCPC.31 7 By relying on section 62-1100(b)(5) and refusing to recognize the clarifying amendment to SCPC
section 62-1-100(b)(4), which codifies the common-law rule, 1 8 the court
adversely affected substantive rights.
The right to take property by will or intestacy is certainly substantive
and should accrue as of the decedent's death.31 9 However, the McDaniel
court effectively took away the vested property rights of the beneficiaries by
applying a law enacted after the decedent's death. The law in effect at the
time of the decedent's death provided that the intestate heirs would take the
lapsed share of the residue. 311 Consequently, from the decedent's death on
June 18, 1986 until the date of the court's opinion on November 26, 1990,
the decedent's intestate heirs owned the lapsed property. The court's
decision effectively confiscated the property from the decedent's heirs and
substituted the surviving residuary devisees as owners as of the date of the
opinion.
McDaniel not only disrupted established ownership of property, it
contradicted the decedent's intent. A decedent's will is deemed to speak as
of the time of the decedent's death, and, because the general rule applies the
law in effect at the time of death, the decedent is presumed to know the
extant law. 2' A testator who relies on the law in effect at death presumably intends for that law to apply. Thus, in McDaniel the decedent was
charged with knowledge of the then-applicable "no-residue-of-a-residue"

314. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-53-10 to -140 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
315. McDaniel, 303 S.C. at 500-01, 401 S.E.2d at 863.
316. Id. at 501-02, 401 S.E.2d at 863-64. The SCPC section governing lapsed
residuary devises presumes that the surviving residuary devisees take the share of a
lapsed residuary devisee. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-604(b) (Law. Co-op. 1987). The preSCPC rule-the "no-residue-of-a-residue" rule-generally passed the lapsed residuary
devisee's share to the testator's heirs under partial intestacy. See Padgett v. Black, 229
S.C. 142, 154, 92 S.E.2d 153, 159 (1956). See generally Medlin, supra note 1, at 654
(discussing lapsed devises).
317. McDaniel, 303 S.C. at 502, 401 S.E.2d at 864.
318. See supranote 311.
319. This is especially true for real property, for which not only the right, but also the
title generally devolves to the heirs and devisees immediately upon the decedent's death.
See S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-3-101 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992).
320. See supranote 316.
321. See supra note 297.
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rule; 3" because he did not indicate an intent to the contrary, he must have
intended for that rule to apply. The court, however, fashioned a different
result.
C. Undermining Title
The White and McDaniel decisions undermine any certainty about the
status of title in South Carolina. Under the rule espoused in those cases,
substantive rights that presumably accrued to heirs and devisees of decedents
who died before the SCPC became effective will be disregarded if: (1) an
action is brought after the effective date of the SCPC and (2) the SCPC
would reach a different substantive result.
For example, if a decedent died in 1960, leaving a will devising the
entire estate to the decedent's "heirs as if the decedent dies intestate, " 323
the general rule would determine the heirs according to the law in effect at
the date of the testator's death. If the decedent were survived by a wholeblood brother and a half-blood sister, the whole-blood brother would have
taken the entire estate.324 Under the rationale of White II and McDaniel,
if a question of title to that property arises in the year 2000, a court would
first look to the following basic rule of construction: "Half bloods.., are
included in class gift terminology and terms of relationship in accordance
with rules for determining relationships for purposes of intestate succession. . .. "325 Invoking the magical term "rule of construction," the court
would then apply the SCPC substantive rules326 and award equal shares to
the whole-blood brother and the half-blood sister, changing the ownership
status of the property forty years after the decedent's death.327
The White-McDaniel rationale fails to recognize that virtually every will
construction case obviously involves some rule of construction, which, given
the court's reasoning, automatically invokes section 62-1-100(b)(5). The
court should instead limit section 62-1-100(b)(5) to procedural matters that
do not include substantive issues. 28

322. See supra note 316 and accompanying text.
323. Leaving testate property to devisees to be determined as if the decedent had died
intestate is not an uncommon testamentary provision. See ROBERT P. WILKINS,
DRAFTING WILLS AND TRUST AGREEMENTS 391 (1980).
324. S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-3-20 (Law. Co-op. 1976) (repealed by the SCPC).
325. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-609 (Law. Co-op. 1987) (titled "Construction of generic
terms to accord with relationships as defined for intestate succession").
326. Id. §§ 62-2-103 to -106 (Law. Co-op. 1987 & Supp. 1992).
327. The SCPC would not prevent a determination of title more than 40 years after
the decedent's death. See id. § 62-3-108 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992).
328. One basic rule of statutory construction requires a court to read the provisions
of a statute as consistent, if possible. E.g., Chris J. Yahnis Coastal, Inc. v. Stroh
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IV. COURT IGNORES STATUTE GOVERNING CONTRACTS
FOR SUCCESSION

In Chapman v. Citizens & Southern National Bank329 the decedent
held, at the time of her death, a testamentary general power of appointment
over a testamentary trust created by her husband. Both the decedent and her
late husband had children by a prior marriage. The husband's testamentary
trust provided that, in default of the exercise of the power of appointment,
the trust assets were to pass to the husband's children. However, the decedent's will exercised the power and appointed the property to her children.330

Brewery Co., 295 S.C. 243, 368 S.E.2d 64 (1988). By limiting the effect of § 62-1100(b)(5) to purely procedural issues, the court would avoid establishing an inconsistency
between that section and § 62-1-100(b)(4). Moreover, by construing § 62-1-100(b)(5) as
it did, the court effectively rendered § 62-1-100(b)(4) meaningless.
Even if these two sections are irreconcilable, the court should have used another
basic rule of statutory construction to reach a different conclusion: if two statutory provisions are inconsistent, the more recent and more specific provisions should control. E.g.,
Ramsey v. County of McCormick, 306 S.C. 393, 412 S.E.2d 408 (1991); Lloyd v.
Lloyd, 295 S.C. 55, 367 S.E.2d 153 (1988). Section 62-1-100(b)(4), as clarified by
amendment, see supra notes 310-311 and accompanying text, is both more recent and
more specific and was available to the court by the time of the McDaniel decision.
The supreme court has been correct about the operation of § 62-1-100 when only
a procedural issue is in question. In Van Sant v. Smith, 301 S.C. 556, 393 S.E.2d 174
(1990), the decedent died before July 1, 1987, the effective date of the SCPC. Prior to
the SCPC's effective date, the executrix commenced an appeal of the probate court's

decision in a dispute over the testator's mental capacity. However, after the SCPC's
effective date, the contestants moved to hear the appeal on the record according to SCPC
procedure. As noted in Van Sant, § 62-1-308(d) of the SCPC provides that appeals from
the probate court to the circuit court are on the record and not de novo. Id. at 558, 393
S.E.2d at 175. The court also cited Rules 74 and 75 of the South Carolina Rules of Civil
Procedure. Id. at 558 n.1, 393 S.E.2d at 175 n.1.
The Van Sant court referred to § 62-1-100(b)(2) concerning procedural issues for
matters commenced before the effective date of the SCPC. Id. at 559, 393 S.E.2d at 175.
That section provides for the application of the SCPC procedure unless the "interest of
justice" requires application of the pre-SCPC procedure. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-1100(b)(2) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992). Under the pre-SCPC procedure, all appeals to the
circuit court were on the record except for will contests, which were entitled to a de
novo hearing and a jury trial. The pre-SCPC procedure did not allow jury trials in the
probate court. Van Sant, 301 S.C. at 558, 393 S.E.2d at 175. The court held that the
"interest of justice" required a jury trial. Id. at 559, 393 S.E.2d at 175. The former
procedure allowed a jury trial on appeal, id. at 558, 393 S.E.2d at 175, but the current
procedure permits a jury trial in the probate court, id. at 558-59, 393 S.E.2d at 175. If
the Van Sant court had applied the SCPC procedure, the executrix would have been
deprived of a jury trial in either court.
329. 302 S.C. 469, 395 S.E.2d 446 (Ct. App. 1990).
330. Id. at 475, 395 S.E.2d at 450.
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The court noted that the husband's testamentary trust granted the
decedent a general power of appointment to enable the couple to comply, to
their advantage, with the estate tax laws in effect when the husband signed
"
his will.33
' According to the court, numerous letters in the record established that the decedent had promised her husband that she would not
exercise the power.332 The court held that a confidential relationship
existed between the decedent and her husband because he trusted her to act
"relating to the corpus of his estate after his . . . death" and that she had
"the power to abuse the confidence" for her own benefit.333 The Chapman
court determined that the decedent had promised her husband that she would
not exercise the power of appointment, so that the trust would pass to his
children. Because the confidential relationship existed and the decedent
broke her promise, the court imposed a constructive trust in favor of the
children of the decedent's husband.334
Chapman overlooked the obviously applicable provisions of SCPC
section 62-2-701, which provides rules for contracts concerning succession. 335 Section 62-2-701 codifies the common-law right to enter into
contracts to make a will, not to make a will, to revoke a will, and not to
revoke a will. 336 The SCPC imposes the additional requirement that
contracts concerning succession, entered into after the effective date of the
SCPC, be proved by some type of acceptable writing.337 Before the enactment of the SCPC, it was possible to prove oral contracts concerning
succession.338
The traditional method of enforcing contracts concerning succession

331. See id. at 474 n.2, 395 S.E.2d at 450 n.2. The court rejected the finding in the
appealed order that not permitting the decedent to exercise the power of appointment was
"tax fraud" because the decedent did not change her mind about following her husband's
wishes until after he died. Id. at 480-81, 395 S.E.2d at 453.
332. Id. at 474, 395 S.E.2d at 450.
333. Id. at 477, 395 S.E.2d at 451.
334. Id. at 478, 395 S.E.2d at 452.
335. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-701 (Law. Co-op. 1987 & Supp. 1992).
336. See Pruitt v. Moss, 271 S.C. 305, 247 S.E.2d 324 (1978); Corontzes v. Trapalis,
259 S.C. 244, 191 S.E.2d 523 (1972); Havird v. Schissell, 251 S.C. 416, 162 S.E.2d
877 (1968); Caulder v. Knox, 251 S.C. 337, 162 S.E.2d 262 (1968); Footman v. Sweat,
247 S.C. 172, 146 S.E.2d 624 (1966) (per curiam); Hayes v. Israel, 242 S.C. 497, 131
S.E.2d 506 (1963); Brown v. Graham, 242 S.C. 491, 131 S.E.2d 421 (1963); Looper
v. Whitaker, 231 S.C. 219, 98 S.E.2d 266 (1957); Dean v. Dean, 229 S.C. 430, 93
S.E.2d 206 (1956); Ellisor v. Watts, 227 S.C. 411, 88 S.E.2d 351 (1955); McConnell
v. Crocker, 217 S.C. 334, 60 S.E.2d 673 (1950).
337. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-701.
338. See Corontzes, 259 S.C. 244, 191 S.E.2d 523; Havird, 251 S.C. 416, 162 S.E.2d
877; Cauder,251 S.C. 337, 162 S.E.2d 262; Footman, 247 S.C. 172, 146 S.E.2d 624;
Hayes, 242 S.C. 497, 131 S.E.2d 506; Brown, 242 S.C. 491, 131 S.E.2d 421.
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reconciled the differing goals of the laws of wills and contracts. According
to trust and estate law, a competent testator maintains the right to make,
amend, or revoke a will until death.339 Contract law is designed to enforce
contracts. In the case of contracts concerning succession, the compromise
between the two policies is to probate whatever will, if any, was last
executed by the decedent before death, but to effectively enforce the contract
through the imposition of a constructive trust.y °
The usual rules of contract formation apply, and mutual consideration
is necessary. 34 ' A promise for a promise would constitute sufficient
consideration, but the lack of consideration would preclude finding that a
contract exists.34 2 Thus, cases in which testators create enforceable
contracts by making mutual promises concerning succession are distinguishable from cases in which no consideration passes. 34 Based on this distinction, courts have declined to enforce mere moral obligations, which, unlike
actual bilateral promises, otherwise fail to suffice as consideration for a
contract.3 "
The Chapman court could have enforced the contract under section 622-701341 by simply determining that the Chapmans had entered into a
binding contract not to revoke. Instead, by basing its decision solely on the
existence of a confidential relationship, the court risked creating a new
reason for enforcing a promise not to revoke-the moral obligation.
Generally, a moral obligation alone is not sufficient under the case law to
enforce a promise not to revoke. 4 6 Thus, by ignoring the statute directly
on point, which presumably would have rendered the same result, the court
may have unnecessarily created the genesis for future testamentary
enforcement of mere moral obligations in cases lacking the evidence
sufficient to support the existence of a contract.

339. See Brown v. Drake, 275 S.C. 299, 270 S.E.2d 130 (1980); Madden v. Madden,
237 S.C. 629, 118 S.E.2d 443 (1961); Lowe v. Fickling, 207 S.C. 442, 36 S.E.2d 293
(1945); Alexander v. Walden, 287 S.C. 126, 337 S.E.2d 241 (Ct. App. 1985).
340. See Looper, 231 S.C. 219, 98 S.E.2d 266.
341. See, e.g., Cauder,251 S.C. 337, 162 S.E.2d 262.
342. See Pruitt v. Moss, 271 S.C. 305, 247 S.E.2d 324 (1978); Cauder,251 S.C.

337, 162 S.E.2d 262; Oursler v. Armstrong, 179 N.E.2d 489 (N.Y. 1961).
343. See Pruitt,271 S.C. 305, 247 S.E.2d 324; Caulder,251 S.C. 337, 162 S.E.2d
262; Oursler, 179 N.E.2d 489.

344. See Oursler, 179 N.E.2d 489.
345. The court expressly acknowledged the promises made: "We hold as a matter of

fact that [Mrs. Chapman's] words are tantamount to a promise." Chapman v. Citizens
& S. Nat'l Bank, 302 S.C. 469, 474 n.3, 395 S.E.2d 446, 450 n.3 (Ct. App. 1990).
Presumably, a promise by Mr. Chapman could be inferred because he died with the
arranged estate plan in effect.

346. See Oursler, 179 N.E.2d at 490.
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CONCLUSION

In at least three areas, the South Carolina appellate courts have
threatened established legislative intent and legal doctrine. Because of its
ambiguity and imprecision, the Seifert opinion may have, at worst,
contravened a clear expression of the general assembly's recognized
purpose, created the potential for further erosion of legislative intent, and
destroyed the time-honored recognition of the validity of revocable trusts.
Even the most innocuous interpretation of Seifert introduces uncertainty into
the practice of estate planning and opens the door for profligate litigation
involving the elective share. The court arguably could have relied on a
different, less disruptive theory to obtain the same result.347 Patrickraises
the specter that waivers are ineffective whenever circumstances later change.
Because most waivers anticipate dynamic circumstances, the decision creates
the possibility that waivers will be unable to accomplish the purposes for
which they are intended. 348 As in Seifert, the Patrick court could have
relied on a less sweeping theory to accomplish the same result.
The White andMcDaniel decisions mock traditional concepts of vesting,
title, and ownership by treating genuine issues of substantive rights merely
as issues of construction. Continued adherence to the White-McDaniel
rationale could undermine certainty about the status of title in South
Carolina.
Finally, by ignoring the clearly applicable provisions of SCPC section
62-2-701, the court in Chapman may have created a new ground for
enforcing promises concerning succession based on a moral obligation that
falls short of a contract. The result is contrary to the purpose of section 622-701 to restrict enforcement of such promises when the evidence is not
sufficiently reliable.349

The implications of these decisions portend serious consequences for a
sincere construction of legislative intent under the relatively nascent SCPC.
Perhaps, by recognizing these problems, the South Carolina appellate courts
can decide future SCPC cases without disrupting the purpose of the
legislature and the settled doctrines of common law. By restricting the inferences of these cases, concentrating on using more precise reasoning and
language, and focusing on the goal of upholding the statutory law rather
than on the desire to accomplish a narrow result, perhaps the courts may be
able to ameliorate any past damage and avoid any future harm to the estate
and probate practice in South Carolina.

347. See supra part lI.C.4.a.-g.
348. See supra notes 280-282 and accompanying text.
349. See supra notes 335-337 and accompanying text.
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